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What are the origins of tactical innovation in large, bureaucratic, military 
systems?  This study will provide a detailed analysis of how the German Army in 
World War One took advantage of innovative tactical methods developed by their 
junior and non-commissioned officers (NCO) in the field.  While many historians 
often look at the results of WWI from the perspective of the General officers and 
politicians (i.e., top-down), they often overlook the important roles played by 
creative junior officers in revolutionizing the manner in which the German Army 
fought.  These innovations, when supported by senior leadership, led to massive 
operational and strategic gains for the German Army late in World War One.  
Moreover, the study will explore how the German Army successfully applied 
these tactical innovations at the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, a.k.a. The Battle of 
Caporetto in 1917.  The result was a crushing Italian defeat.  This success 
encouraged the German leadership to attempt similar offensives in 1918 on the 
Western Front in France. Initially successful, the offensives later stalled.  
However, the lessons of these attacks formed the basis for what would become 
universally known as the Blitzkrieg, or “lighting-war” tactics.  These lessons 
continue to effect how modern militaries employ combined arms in maneuver 
warfare today.  This case study will highlight the importance of “bottom-up” 
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Soči (To the Soča) 
 
…How beautiful you are, lucid daughter of the mountain, 
so graceful in your natural beauty, 
your diaphanous depths are not troubled by the tempests rage! 
Yet, alas, you poor one, 
Fearful tempests, terrible storms are threatening you. 
From the warm south they will come 
raging across your fertile plains. 
Alas, not long away is that day. 
Clear sky above you, 
hail of bullets around you, 
and rain of blood and stream of tears, 
thunder and lightning. 
Swords will cut here,  
blood will run knee deep, 
our blood will feed you, 
enemy blood will spoil you! ...  
- SIMON GREGORČIČ (1844 – 1906) 1 





                                            
1 Simon Gregorčič, Soči, 1879, downloaded from http://www.camillopavan.it/bitka_pri 
_Kobaridu/Simon%20Gregorcic.htm.  Many believe Gregorčič predicted the bloodshed of WWI in 
his stirring poem from 1879 about his beloved River Soča.  This poem and the likeness of its 
author were often used in Austrian postcards and propaganda to motivate the soldiers to defend 




























I asked about the break through and he had heard at the Brigade 
that the Austrians had broken through … up toward Caporetto.  “It’s 
Germans that are attacking.”  The word Germans was something to 
be frightened of.  We did not want to have anything to do with the 
Germans. 2 
- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms 
 
A. SCOPE 
Few in the United States military will contest that its bureaucratic structure 
does little to aid quick adaptation of innovative tactical ideas coming from the 
field.  The services like to believe in the motto they preach, “Centralized control, 
and decentralized execution.”  With the growth of information technologies and 
capabilities, those at the highest levels of command now have the ability to 
intervene directly, and rapidly, in the decentralized executions of their 
subordinates.  Such intervention is making it difficult for tactical commanders in 
the field to adapt to the quickly changing battlespace environments, without 
having to ask permission first from above.   
Even with a highly educated officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) 
corps, innovative ideas at the tactical level are often stifled.  Why?  Simply, it is 
the increased visibility of operations and the potential for interference by 
commanders at the operational and strategic levels of the decision making 
process.  This is not entirely the fault of operational and strategic commanders.  
The technological advancements of the last two decades have brought the battle-
space environment to commanders’ fingertips.  Thus giving them unprecedented 
control over those in the field and preventing innovative commanders from being 
just that, innovative.  This is not the first time the rapid growth in technology and 
doctrine has outpaced the ability of militaries to adapt.  One does not need to 
look far back into modern military history to find similar circumstances reflected 
across the changing the face of warfare. 
                                            
2 Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms, Scribner, 1929, 187. 
2 
B. BACKGROUND 
The first decade of the Twenty-first Century is not in a unique period in 
military history.  Advancements in technology played an important role in 
transforming modern warfare in the past.  At no other time in recent history has 
technology changed warfare more so than it did during World War I (WWI).  
Advances in weaponry, communications, transportation, and tactics required 
military powers to adapt new tactics and strategies in order to fight in a “modern” 
industrial and technological world.  During WWI most combatants struggled to 
adapt to the requirements of industrial warfare, leading to millions of casualties 
among the armies engaged.  Germany, earlier than any other country engaged in 
combat in WWI, was able to adapt tactically to the demands of industrialized 
warfare.  While it was too late in the war to bring overall victory to the Germans, it 
was not too late to revolutionize the tactics and strategy that followed.   
The above quote from Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms describes 
an attack that actually occurred in October 1917, during the height of combat in 
WWI.  It took place on the “Italian Front” along the Isonzo River (Figure 1), in 
what is today Northeastern Italy and Western Slovenia.  After eleven Italian 
offensives and more than two-and-a-half years of fighting, this would be the last, 
and the first, German Austro-Hungarian offensive along this front. By the time of 
the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, or The Battle of Caporetto, the German Army 
had fully integrated the innovative ideas of “mobile warfare” into their tactical, 
operational, and strategic level planning. Initially developed on the Western 
Front, these strategies were finally perfected in the much more open terrain of 
the Eastern Front.  Included were many revolutionary tactics developed by junior 
officers (lieutenants, captains, and NCO’s) early-on in WWI and then fully 
integrated into German military training.  The result was a crushing defeat of 
nearly the entire Italian Army.  This victory closed one of the bloodiest campaigns 
of the entire war.  The German and Austro-Hungarian Armies hoped to drive 
another Allied power from the war; its fourth since the war began.  Ludendorff, 
convinced of the value of the new tactics, would try two great offensives in 1918 
based on the same tactics used along the Isonzo.  Initially, the offensives 
3 
achieved the same level of success, only to become bogged down when forces 
advanced beyond logistics and heavy artillery.  Although Germany would win a 
majority of the battles, she would ultimately lose the war.   
At the onset of WWI, warfare itself was on the verge of a drastic change.  
New technologies, tactics, and ideas were being developed on the run that would 
lead to revolutionary changes; the effects of which are still being felt today.  
Though ultimately the “losers” in WWI, the German military led the way in 
innovative tactical developments, eventually changing how modern armies fought 
in the 20th Century – both conventionally and unconventionally.  
The last major conflicts on the continent served as models for “modern 
warfare” for the European powers in 1914 – the Wars of German Unification in 
the mid-19th Century, of which The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was the last.  
From 1870 through the turn of the century, the Prussian/German model – warfare 
of annihilation – was becoming the preeminent focus of general staffs, in Europe 
and around the world.  The French, badly defeated by the Prussian Army in 
1870, began to focus on a strategy based on fixed defenses.  Large fortified 
towns and cities were built-up, and others were enlarged, along the entire 
German, French, and Belgium borders to defend against future German 
invasions. 
As WWI opened the Germans went to war behind the plans of Alfred Graf 
von Schlieffen.  The “Schlieffen Plan,” as it is now known, was based on the 
belief that a rapid envelopment and annihilation of enemy forces would bring 
success and a quick end to the war, much the same as in 1870 against the 
French.  The German forces learned quickly that such success would not be the 
result.  Early in the war, the Germans utilized high powered rifles as the primary 
killing weapon of the infantry.  They marched into combat in open order 
formations, with bayonets fixed, only to be mowed down by walls of heavy 
artillery and machinegun fire.  New weapons were slow to be adopted into the 
German ranks.  Machine guns were seen as an entirely defensive weapon 
4 
system.  Hand-grenades, mortars, light artillery and flamethrowers were the sole 
responsibility of the engineers (known as “pioneers”) and artillerymen. 
The failures to achieve victory through mobility in 1914 and early 1915 
would lead to radical changes.  Under a new chief of staff, General Erich von 
Falkenhayn, German tactics of warfare shifted from “annihilation” to the “attrition” 
of enemy forces and resources.  Armies were no longer small, professional, and 
easily sustainable entities.  To conduct war in the modern industrial age would 
require large armies and the full mobilization of the resources of the country, 
including its population.  The industrialization of warfare came with technology 
that dramatically hastened the rate at which combatants would kill each other. 
Falkenhayn would use, squander really, these human and industrial resources to 
produce an epic slaughter on the Western Front – millions killed between lines 
that barely shifted through 1917.  The combatants, Germany included, were 
being bled white, while accomplishing little of military utility.  Something had to be 
done, a new style of war concocted. 
 
C. PERSPECTIVE 
The situation in 1914 was similar to the post-Cold War era.  Warfare is 
undergoing a radical change, not only technologically, but also in the way it is 
being fought.  The United States military is still struggling to adapt to major 
changes, like those currently being witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In the last 
sixty-five years the United States has had to rely on a large military mainly out of 
necessity (Germans, Japanese, Soviets, etc.).  Today’s military is a vestige of 
that necessity.  Those the United States is fighting, or may have to fight in the 
future, will likely never stand toe-to-toe in open combat with the U.S. military.  
They will engage in insurgent warfare, as the Achilles heel is exposed daily by 
reports out of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The questions have been asked, “Why don’t 
we learn from the lessons of Vietnam, the Soviets in Afghanistan, or the British in 
Malaya?”  What WWI shows is that changing a military bureaucracy should come 
from within.  When given a chance by senior leadership, those in the field can 
successfully adapt how they fight and win. 
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While many historians look at the results of WWI from the perspective of 
the General Officers and politicians, top-down, they frequently overlook the 
important roles played by creative junior and non-commissioned officers.  
Through a detailed study of the events leading up to and through the final 
campaign on the Isonzo, this study seeks to show how the German Army took 
advantage of innovative tactical ideas at its lowest command ranks and 
implemented them into a successful strategy of mobile warfare.  Twenty years 
later these ideas would form the foundation for what would become the “lightning 
war” tactics of the classic German “Blitzkrieg.”  In essence, this study will 
highlight the importance of tactical innovation at the lowest levels in modern 
warfare – a lesson certainly applicable today.  In the end, the need for “bottom-
up” tactical innovation within today’s U.S. military is critical; especially when 
many of its senior leaders appear as tradition-bound and centralized as those 
who commanded the armies that led the world into, and through, WWI.   
 
Figure 1.   Topographical depiction of the Isonzo Front – Isonzo River is 
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II. THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM 
I said, “In the old days the Austrians were always whipped in the 
quadrilateral around Verona. They let them come down onto the 
plain [Friuli] and whipped them there.”  “Yes,” said Gino.  “But those 
were Frenchmen and you can work out military problems clearly 
when you are fighting in somebody else’s country.” 3 
- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms 
 
A. NINETEENTH CENTURY WARFARE EXPOSED 
Before WWI, none of the combatants about to face each other on the 
battlefield were able to predict the course of combat once the war commenced.  
The Industrial Revolution, during the first sixty years of the 19th Century, would 
introduce significant changes, but the speed of innovation was still relatively 
slow.  Breech-loading rifled artillery, repeating magazine fed rifles, machine guns, 
and the railroad were all waiting in the wings.  Significant increases in firepower, 
from essentially muzzle-loading small arms alone, had forced troops into the 
trenches during the latter stages of the American Civil War; particularly in the 
Richmond-Petersburg Campaign.  Imagine for a moment, how different the 
outcome of the Civil War, and future wars that followed, would have been had 
early machine gun technology – in development at the time – been employed by 
both the Confederacy and the Union. 
The Crimean War in 1856 began the transition into modern warfare.  
Nevertheless, the American Civil War was the first modern war.  Most of the 
strategic technology employed in WWI was in use, or development, during the 
Civil War.  Both Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant used railroads extensively to 
provide strategic mobility undreamed of in earlier conflicts.  Communications 
between commanders no longer depended on the fastest horse and messenger 
any longer.  The telegraph allowed a near real-time communication capability in 
the field.  Massive artillery bombardments would precede all major advances in 
                                            
3 Hemingway, 185. 
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order to soften up the enemy and cover advances.  The idea of “total war” was 
not a new concept at the time of WWI and the German General Staff.  The Union 
commanders understood that breaking the back of the South not only required 
destroying the fighting arm, but breaking the civilian will and logistical 
breadbasket as well.  At the mid-point of the war the U.S. navy no longer 
resembled the navy that opened the war.  Fleets of “ironclad” steam-powered 
gun boats had replaced the larger, more classic, wooden sailing ships of the line.  
The Confederacy, in order to break the naval blockade, even experimented with 
submarine warfare.  Naval combat after the Civil War would never resemble what 
it had been imagined only five years earlier.  An air component of the Civil War, 
balloons for artillery spotting, was witnessed as well during the Civil War, though 
it would still be a few decades before the third dimension of combat would be 
effectively added to the arsenals of world armies.  
Getting back to the earlier point about the machine guns, a weapon 
destined to be the nemesis of infantrymen in WWI; a workable model pioneered 
by Gatling was available and could have been employed had it not been for the 
conservatism of the Unions procurement agents.  It would soon migrate to 
Europe, but without any conception of how it could be best employed.  
The French in 1870, and the British in 1898, had amassed machine guns 
in batteries like artillery but had found them peculiarly vulnerable to enemy 
artillery attack.  The dilemma now became how to deploy machine guns in action.  
Previously, they had been used with inconclusive results, in part because there 
were so few of them.4  By the turn of the century, planners were still struggling to 
integrate these innovations into military doctrine.  Douglas Haig, who participated 
in Kitchener’s expedition into the Sudan in 1898 lamented, “I trust for the sake of 
the British cavalry that more tactical knowledge exists in the higher ranks of the 
average regiment than we have displayed in this one.”5  Throughout the Egyptian 
campaign, Haig lamented the lack of machine guns in the ranks.   
                                            
4 Hubert Johnson, Breakthrough! Tactics, Technology, and the Search for Victory on the 
Western Front in WWI, Presidio Press, 1994, 4. 
5 Johnson, 6. 
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Even the Spanish-American War foreshadowed the lack of preparation for 
conducting modern technological war.  In one of the most famous battles from 
that conflict, San Juan Hill, a dismounted cavalry unit faced a dug-in Spanish 
force.  An uphill frontal assault was chosen as the method for taking the hill, this 
in the face of modern high-powered breech loading rifles.  Due to the low morale 
of Spanish troops, the attack was eventually successful, but U.S. casualties were 
very heavy.  Tactically, bypassing or outflanking San Juan Hill by maneuver and 
mobility would have resulted in fewer casualties, and possibly had the same 
strategic effect.  This battle and the Spanish American War in general should 
have highlighted for U.S. military commanders the changing nature of warfare, 
and how under-prepared U.S. forces were.  Unfortunately, the United States was 
as woefully unprepared for war in 1918 as the majority of other combatants of 
1914.   
 
B. THE BOER WAR & RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
At the beginning of the 20th Century two conflicts demonstrated the brutal 
impact the Industrial Revolution had upon open warfare - The Boer War and the 
Russo-Japanese War.  Advisors and staff from all major European powers 
witnessed the events of these conflicts and gained sobering insights into the 
future of “modern warfare” but curiously the lessons learned were quickly 
forgotten.    
Count Sternberg, a former German officer who sought service with the 
Boers, claimed:  “The modern rifles, with their immense range and rapidity of fire, 
and the smokeless powder, have completely upset old principles of tactics . . . in 
the wars of the past an energetic offensive had led to victory, in the wars of the 
future it will lead to destruction.”6  The Russo-Japanese War contained numerous 
examples of entrenchments being protected by machine guns.  Both the Boer 
War and the Russo-Japanese War highlighted how ineffective the massed linear 
infantry attack had become.  Alfred von Schlieffen remarked, “A complete change  
 
                                            
6 Johnson, 6. 
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of tactics is necessary,” because it was no longer possible for two lines to 
advance against one another.  Nor was it possible to use the deep columns so 
common to Napoleonic warfare.7 
Boer lines of defense were well organized and strong.  Friedrich von 
Bernhardi, a member of the German General Staff noted that English artillery had 
little effect on Boers hidden in trenches and behind other cover.  British 
commander Lord Roberts only succeeded in defeating the Boers because he 
turned their trenches by flanking them.  Turning the Boers out of their trenches 
required great effort and resulted in considerable casualties.8 
The Russo-Japanese War was of a much larger scale than that of the 
Boer War.  Foreign military observers typically accompanied the more successful 
Japanese force.  It was noted in reports throughout the conflict that the Russians 
defended their positions well, but attacked poorly.  Frontal assaults, with 
bayonets fixed, were consistently employed by both sides and led to large 
expenditures of infantry.  An anonymous Russian observer, commenting on the 
aftermath of Japanese attacks at Port Arthur noted, “A thick, unbroken mass of 
corpses covered the cold earth like a coverlet.”9  Bernhardi again noted that, “In 
the future, extensive use of spade work will be made with the object of gaining 
cover against the greater effect of firearms.”10  Both conflicts closely resembled 
the warfare of 1914.  Nevertheless, these wars were fought far from Europe, as 
was the American Civil War.  On the continent, military planners allowed 
themselves the self-indulgent fantasy that European Armies, better trained and 
better equipped, would somehow negate the brutal logic of massive firepower. 
 
C. WARFARE IN 1914 & 1915 
First Lieutenant Erwin Rommel’s observations of the war in Belgium and 
Northern France in 1914 and 1915 ironically echo the reports of Bernhardi almost 
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fifteen years earlier, “The 3rd Battalion paid dearly for having established itself 
close to the southern edge of the woods.  These units were not dug in properly.  
The heavy French artillery fire produced devastating results among the troops 
stationed in and on the edge of the woods.”11  Lieutenant Rommel was one of 
the pioneering junior officers in the German Army during WWI.  He was credited 
with developing techniques for his Württemberg Mountain Battalion, later in the 
war, similar to those of Assault Battalions being formed in all the German 
divisions (Assault Battalions will be discussed in detail later in this paper). 
At the outbreak of war in 1914, the British, French, and German training 
manuals remained remarkably unchanged from those fifty years earlier.  Given 
the reports of the R-J War by officers, oddly, even the British failed to strengthen 
infantry battalions with additional machine guns.  British manuals stressed 
marksmanship and the “vigorous offensive.”12  In the new modern warfare all 
arms had to work together.  The French training manual stated, “Infantry 
depends upon artillery to enable it to obtain superiority of fire and close with the 
enemy.”13  The French manual also stressed the infantry attack as well; 
emphasizing deep columns behind advanced skirmishers.  According to the 
manuals, French artillery would perform only two functions: 1) support the 
advance and 2) counterbattery fire.  Moreover, supporting the advance always 
had priority over counterbattery work. 
Before 1911, the Prussian Army was not noted for tactical innovation.  Its 
General Staff was still immersed in analysis of the Franco-Prussian War.  A 
majority of effort was spent trying to meld science, mathematics, and war in the 
hopes of coming up with a pseudo-formula for the execution of combat.  The 
followers of Schlieffen, particularly the younger Moltke – the son of the hero of 
the German Wars of Unification – made progress in improving and modernizing 
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tactics.  The result was the formation of machine gun companies, and the 
issuance of tactical manuals for the machine gun in 1913 and 1914. 
By 1914, aircraft, dirigibles, telegraphs, telephones, wireless telegraphy, 
automobiles, and armored vehicles were all added to the arsenals of most field 
armies.  Initially, technical limitations were so great that many planners placed 
limited emphasis on them.  This excuse cannot be used, however, by those who 
failed to take advantage of machine guns or rapid fire artillery.  By the end of the 
Russo-Japanese and Boer Wars these weapons had already reached a high 
state of development. 
The direction of warfare was being dictated by senior leaders, on their 
respective General Staffs, and not by the technology being developed.  When the 
call to action came in 1914 men marched into combat poorly equipped for 
modern warfare (Figure 2 and 3) with bugles blaring, in linear formations, 
bayonets fixed, with pomp-and-circumstance resembling the flare of Napoleonic 
times.  Bayonets still glistened in the sun as the troops marched in long 
formations towards the front.  However, the bayonets were now attached to 
modern magazine fed rifles.  Railroads brought men and supplies close to the 
front lines, but horses and mules were still required to get the supplies forward.  
The telegraph and telephone streamlined communications, but the lines were 
easily cut by man and/or artillery.  The runner still played an important role in the 
heat of battle.  Few realized that with the introduction of chemical weapons 
supply trains had now become vulnerable.  Not only were soldiers soon to be the 
target of chemical attacks, but so too were the horse and mule columns that 
supplied the men with food and ammunition (Figure 4).  
Barbed wire was another little noticed invention of 1914 combat that that 
changed how all ground combat would be fought thereafter.  Even if an attacking 
force had every possible advantage, the defender only needed well laid barbed 
wire ahead of his position.  The attack was almost guaranteed to grind to a halt.  
Now the attacker had to send men out to cut the wire, or blast a hole through it 
with artillery, and that served to alert the defending force to an upcoming assault.  
13 
If the wire wasn’t cut, the attacking force would lose cohesion attempting to cross 
the wire barrier in the midst of battle – making them prime target for defensive 
machine guns, mortars, and artillery.  These type of entrapments and 
entanglements were not new when WWI began.  Typically, they consisted of 
pointed stakes or fences laboriously put up to protect defending forces.  Barbed 
wire was a cheap, incredibly simple, and quickly constructed alternative to what 
had been used in the past and could be easily massed produced.  Imagine trying 
to build a wood barricade from the English Channel to the Swiss-Franc border; 
there wouldn’t be a tree left in Europe. 
Tactically, officers still remained behind the advance so as to best 
maintain order and ensure the integrity of the line.  Warfare remained a linear 
enterprise stressing offensive action – the key tool of that offensive power 
remained artillery.  Yet artillery, especially artillery powered by high explosives, 
could also be used to stop an advance.  This, when combined with machineguns, 
remained the conundrum upon which land assaults foundered.  There were some 
attempts at technological adaptation.  Some of the combat innovations that came 
to be standard issue for soldiers of early WWI were: 1) trench mortars, invented 
by the Germans; 2) steel helmets, also invented by the Germans but adapted in 
some form by most combatants by the end of the war; 3) hand grenades, 
Germans and widely adapted; 4) flame throwers, that’s right, the Germans.  Yet, 
until better tactics were developed, these mostly reinforced the defender.  Still, it 
is notable that was the Germans who did most of the innovating. 
Few countries did much to innovate like Germany and her allies after 
1914.  That is not to say that Germany was any more successful early on.  Yet, 
by attempting to innovate earlier, Germany was at least ahead of her enemies in 
terms of having systems and methods in place.  Few predicted how slowly most 
combatants would adapt, but at least Germany made a concerted effort.  The 
efforts would soon begin to pay off at all levels of command.  Within two years 
mobility would be restored to the Battlefields in the East.  The successes on the 
Eastern Front would slowly begin to spread west.  
 
14 
Figure 2.   Hungarian soldiers posing in the trenches.  Hungarian and Bosnian 
soldiers were known for preferring hand to hand combat (notice the battle 




Figure 3.   Habsburg Army forces along the rocky southern line of defense 
known as the “Carso” shortly after Italy entered the war in 1915.  Early in 
the war soldiers were not yet equipped with protective gear, i.e., helmets 
and gas masks. 
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Figure 4.   Introduction of gas onto the battlefield required forces to protect not 
only their soldiers, but the animals used to supply them.  BELOW: The 
Italians and Austrian both utilized dogs for supplying soldiers in the difficult 
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III. THE BEST OFFENSE IS A BETTER DEFENSE 
The nature of modern war is not a simple matter.  It is subject to 
numerous modifications according to the character of the 
contending parties and the various theatres of war. . . . The 
fundamental principles of war certainly remain the same, wherever 
it is waged; but special conditions cause in each case special 
methods of employment of the fighting forces, and these latter, 
again, will frequently differ. 14 
- Von Bernhardi, 1914 
 
On the Western Front, from 1914 through 1916, offensive action in 
modern warfare, as espoused by Prussian Generals like Bismarck, Helmuth von 
Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff, were being 
checked at every point by strong defensive fortifications and modern technology.  
During this period, two separate and completely opposite schools of thought – 
annihilation vs. attrition – were debated among the highest ranks of the German 
General Staff.  Both strategies would be tested early in WWI, but the attrition 
tactics would lead to what some would call “the most senseless episodes in a 
war not distinguished for sense anywhere.”15  
Frustrated with the lack of success on the Western Front, by 1916, some 
commanders in the General Staff of the German Army began to take notice of 
certain innovative tactics coming from their young leaders in the trenches.  Most 
commanders within the German Army gave junior officers the maximum possible 
discretion in the execution of their duties.  In turn, junior officers relied heavily on 
their NCO’s to accomplish the mission tasks.  Instead of leading from behind, 
many officers and NCOs moved out front, leading their units not as linear 
formation but as individual components of the larger division.  On the Western 
Front small groups of infantry would probe for weak spots in the line, abandoning 
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the massed infantry attack.  Such tactics required a certain kind of organization, 
and the German Army set about creating it.  An army that could probe enemy 
defenses, infiltrate its weak points, and rapidly exploit breakthroughs with deep 
encircling moves, couldn’t be an army that was centrally directed or dependent 
on detailed plans worked out in advance.16 
The decentralization in German tactical execution allowed senior leaders 
to find new ways of approaching the stalemate on the Western Front and return 
the army to more mobile operational approaches.  The junior officers did not 
disappoint.  From their ranks came the ideas that lead to the development of new 
“Assault Battalions,” and a highly selective program that trained the officers and 
NCOs within the service in the new stosstruppen, or “Stormtrooper” tactics to be 
used by the Assault Battalions.  Training spread quickly through the German 
Army, and eventually to the Austro-Hungarian Army as well.   
By 1915 the Germans were making effective use of their own combat 
troops to test new ideas and equipment, rather than specialized testing agencies.  
Assault Battalions formed due to initial efforts by engineers and infantry to solve 
the machine gun and field artillery problem.  To Lieutenant Colonel Max Bauer, 
an expert in siege artillery and an influential officer on the German General Staff, 
the solution was found in advancing artillery alongside the initial infantry 
attacks.17  The Germans had recently developed lightweight (3.7cm) cannon that 
could fill such a purpose.  Bauer proposed the formation of a special unit to test 
this strategy and other new weapons in combat, including flamethrowers, trench 
mortars, and light machine guns.  Unfortunately, due to the pronounced muzzle 
flash of the “assault cannons,” as they were called, it became a favorite target of 
French artillery.  Subsequently, it became very unpopular with the new Assault 
Detachments who were fielding the cannons.  In August of 1915, the future of the 
Assault Detachment would change forever with the replacement of its 
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commander, one Major Calsow, with a decorated combat veteran of the Western 
Front – Captain Willy Martin Rohr. 
In the months following Major Calsows’ replacement Captain Rohr, with 
the aid of his commanding general, would transform his unit from an 
experimental pioneer unit into an elite infantry organization made up of a 
machine gun platoon, a trench mortar platoon, and a flamethrower platoon.  The 
battalion was well on its way to becoming a team composed of different 
weapons, each with its particular virtues and vulnerabilities.18   
Rohr replaced the “assault cannon” with captured Russian 76.2mm field 
guns, and rechristened them the 7.62cm “infantry gun.”  Rohr experimented with 
various body armor combinations, but found they conflicted with the style of 
warfare he was developing – rapid movement and shock.  The one piece of 
armor that was adopted for all operations was the Stahlhem, the steel helmet that 
later became the trademark of the German soldier in both WWI and WWII.  The 
personal equipment was further altered to reflect the type of combat that would 
be undertaken by the soldiers of the newly forming Assault Battalions. 
The heavy leather “jackboots” long associated with the German infantry 
(knee-length boots with exposed metal tacks on the soles that made a distinctive 
sound when marching on solid surfaces) were replaced.  Lighter and more 
durable lace-up leather boots used by the Austrian mountain battalions were 
chosen.  The field uniform was reinforced with leather patches on the knees and 
elbows to facilitate crawling.  Because the hand-grenade was now the weapon of 
choice for the individual stormtrooper, the leather belt and shoulder harness used 
to carry ammunition were replaced with an over-the-shoulder bag for carrying 
more grenades.  Even the standard-issue 1898 Mauser carbine was replaced 
with a lighter version of the same weapon.  
The tactical elements of the Rohr Assault Battalion relied on the 
replacement of skirmish line attacks with surprise assaults of squad-sized 
“stormtroopers.”  The use of supporting arms (flamethrowers, indirect artillery, 
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field artillery, machine guns, and trench mortars), coordinated at the lowest 
leadership levels possible, facilitated the suppression of the enemy during the 
attack (Figure 5 & 6).  Thus, lieutenants, captains, and NCO’s would be in charge 
of the units on the offensive as opposed to the colonel’s and generals behind the 
lines or at the headquarters.  The new tactics facilitated the “rolling-up” of enemy 
trenches by troops armed mostly with nothing more than a rifle and hand 
grenades (Figure 7).19  These principle tactics would be tested, honed, and 
refined against the French in the Vosges Mountains through the end of 1915.   
In 1916, General Falkenhayn (introduced in Chapter I) authorized the 
formation of Assault Battalions, initially for limited objectives in combat. 
Meanwhile, he had undertaken a campaign to, as he called it, “bleed the French 
white.”  This effort would test the existence of the Assault Battalion and further 
define the role it would play in future offensive operations – at Verdun. 
While Verdun proved to be a bloodbath nearly as costly to the Germans 
as the French, it did serve to confirm what “state of the art” German officers 
already knew, that the key to successfully attacking a trench was close 
coordination of heavy weapons managed at the lowest possible levels of 
command, and excellence in close combat by squads capable of moving and 
fighting as independent units.20  Training German infantrymen in Assault 
Battalion tactics became a priority.  At Verdun the precursor of the tactics so 
effective later in 1917 and 1918 would be formed.  Small infantry units equipped 
with the capability of providing their own combat support would bypass the strong 
points of the enemy line in order to attack deep behind the position; further 
allowing other strong pints to be taken from the rear or flank.   
Consequently, the plan to “bleed the French white” was also beginning to 
bleed the Germans in the West as well.  At the same time, Russian forces in the 
East were very close to crushing the Austro-Hungarian forces facing them.  After 
months of fighting, General Falkenhayn would be forced to send forces to the aid 
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of the Austro-Hungarian’s in the East.   Following the end of combat action at 
Verdun, German forces on the Western Front continued to maintain an entirely 
defensive posture.  Focus thus shifted to the East and allowed the Assault 
Detachment further time to hone the skills for which they had already become 
quite accomplished.   
Technological and tactical experimentation within the German Army during 
this period was plentiful.  Many ideas failed.  The tactics discussed above 
highlight the importance of just a few ideas and programs the Germans 
undertook to revolutionize battle strategies.  As these innovations were brought 
to the battlefield, they played a role in transforming modern warfare.  Assault 
training spread quickly, and by mid-1917 the German and Austro-Hungarian 
Armies had defeated the Russian, Rumanian, and Serbian field armies. 
 
Figure 5.   Stormtroopers in the trenches.  Notice how the uniform has 
changed from those early in the war.  Helmets, boots, even the uniforms 
have been modified for the new style of warfare. 
 
 
Courtesy of the Austrian War Archives
22 
Figure 6.   Flammenwerfer or “Flamethrower” assault on Italian positions by 




Figure 7.   BELOW: “Stormtroopers Attack” an artist’s depiction.  BOTTOM: 
Stormtroopers attack at The Battle of Caporetto (1917).  Note: Mt. Nero 
(Krn) in the background of both. 
 
 Courtesy of the Kobarid WWI Museum
Courtesy of the Kobarid WWI Museum
Courtesy of the Austrian War Archives
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IV. CENTRALIZED CONTROL & DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION  
Such tactics required a certain kind of organization, and the 
Germans set about creating it.  An army that could probe enemy 
defenses, infiltrate deep points, and rapidly exploit breakthroughs 
with deep encircling moves couldn’t be an army that was centrally 
directed or dependent on detailed plans worked out in advance.  It 
had to be an army equipped and organized in such a way as to 
permit independent action by its smaller units. 21 
- James Q. Wilson  
But it was the German army’s decision in 1917 to introduce new 
“infiltration tactics” that provided a real tactical solution to the 
stalemate of trench warfare.  These tactics called for a brief 
surprise artillery bombardment aimed at disrupting narrow weak 
points in the enemy line, followed by the quick penetration by small 
independent groups of storm troops who were to bypass points of 
strong resistance and advance as far as possible. 22 
- Keir A. Lieber  
 
Even before Verdun, Captain Rohr was already utilizing the experiences 
of the Assault Battalion as the basis for further training of other Assault 
Detachments, holding training courses for other units.  The first was held in 
December of 1915.  The classes were open to officers and NCO’s from within the 
division and soon spread to other divisions and eventually the entire army.  
Classes were kept small and taught the new method of fighting espoused by 
Rohr. 
The typical column and skirmish line methods of advance were 
“untrained.”  Individual squads were now to be treated as independent entities.  
For Rohr, the objective of the attack required a separate unity of action.  Training 
emphasized the importance of taking advantage of terrain in the movement 
across “no man’s land” so that units were not required to remain in contact with 
each other.  To further ensure effective training, large full-scale mockups of 
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enemy trenches and defenses were built and attacked again and again behind 
German lines.  The mockups consisted of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, 
live fire from mock defenders, and full dress rehearsal attacks.  Immediately, the 
junior officer and NCO relationship on the battlefield was being redefined.  No 
longer would junior officers lead from behind.  Now, they would have to work 
directly with the NCO and the men to achieve the strategic plan of command 
staff.  Gone were the days of mass formations moving across “no man’s land” 
with bayonets fixed.  Getting individual and independent units behind the 
enemy’s line, in order to disrupt, confuse, and defeat mass formations and 
fortifications, were now the main goals of the attack. 
The impact of the training on the junior infantry officers was felt almost 
immediately in the trenches.  The effect on the NCO squad leader in the German 
military cannot be underestimated.  Long used behind the firing line to ensure 
young enlisted men did not break rank and leave the battlefield, the NCO was 
now in front and in command.  Rehearsals allowed the squad to become an 
irreplaceable element responsible for individual actions and coordination of its 
own firepower.  The tactics of the newly named “Assault Battalion Rohr” were 
born in the junior ranks, supported by the senior commanders on the General 
Staff, and quickly spread throughout the armies of the Central Powers. 
In February 1916, Crown Prince William – the chief ally of Colonel Bauer 
and his Assault Battalion concept – invited Captain Rohr to visit him at his 
headquarters where he observed a tactical exercise involving the entire Assault 
Detachment.  Prince William wished to bring all infantry units up to the level of 
Assault Detachment Rohr.  As the fighting at Verdun raged well into 1916 the 
German army began converting units into Assault Detachments based on the 
model of Captain Rohr.  Unfortunately, before all could be trained, Rumania 
entered the war on the side of the Allies.23  The Germans were forced to send a 
hastily assembled force to support their already struggling Austro-Hungarian 
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allies.  Three out of the first four battalions chosen were removed from the school 
and transported to Rumania.  These Jäger, or “Hunter,” Battalions were excellent 
mountain fighters and well suited to the tactics of the Rohr School.  One Jäger 
Battalion remained and became the second Assault Battalion in the German 
army.24 
Clearly, two Assault Detachments were not adequate to meet the need of 
the entirety of the German army.  General von Falkenhayn realized this, and 
before he was demoted from command of the German army, ordered a number 
of his divisions to send two officers and four NCO’s to the Assault Battalion Rohr 
School for training.  The officers would then return back to their units with the 
mission of training company and platoon size assault units within their respective 
divisions.  Many divisions had already formed units on their own initiative, but 
now they would be supported by the General Staff with equipment, training, and 
personnel to fight successfully as true Assault Battalions.25 
By September, the assault units had gained another influential ally: 
General Erich von Ludendorff.  While he was visiting the Crown Prince at his 
headquarters, General Ludendorff was first made aware of the new units being 
trained at and around Verdun.  Having been on the Eastern Front in Russia 
Ludendorff was unaware, for the most part, of the new tactics being utilized.  
Ludendorff had just taken de facto command of the German Army from 
Falkenhayn.  Ludendorff was very impressed with the assault units and was 
convinced they should become the model for the entire army.  On October 23, 
1916 Ludendorff authorized the formation of Assault Battalions within each army 
on the Western Front.26 
Training of new assault battalions was now officially placed into German 
manuals.  For nearly two years junior officers had realized the manuals were 
outdated and obsolete, and had been training contrary to the old method of 
infantry attack.  However, official recognition of this fact by Ludendorff and the                                             
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General Staff two years into the war at least meant new recruits would have the 
benefit of better, more practical, methods of attack.  Erwin Rommel and his 
Württemberg Battalion was one self-trained “assault unit” that developed 
separately from the other Assault Detachments, but the techniques and strategy 
employed fit perfectly with the tactics of the Rohr Assault Battalions (Figure 8).  
In addition, certain officers and NCO’s likely attended the Assault Detachment 
schools at some point.  Still, the incidents of self-training highlight the freedom 
and ability allotted to the German junior officers in combat to think and act freely 
and to adapt to real-world combat situations.  Merit was based not on text book 
solutions, but on how well an officer could react.  The German General Staff was 
coaching the team, but the junior officers and NCO’s were definitely able to call 
the plays.  It was truly a system based on centralized control, but decentralized 
execution at the tactical level. 
In years following Verdun, the Assault Detachments transformed an entire 
system from the bottom up.  The General Staff of the German army bought into 
the new offensive capability of the stormtrooper units. In turn the General Staff 
implemented a plan to ensure each fighting division had the training, equipment, 
logistics, and personnel necessary to deploy such units.  It was left up to the 
officers in charge of the Assault Detachments and their stormtroopers to provide 
the return on investment.  Commenting on the role of command in war, military 
historian Martin van Creveld has shown that improvements in communications 
tend to be used by high-level commanders to reduce the initiative and discretion 
of lower-level commanders, often with disastrous results.  Van Creveld states, 
“Those armies have been most successful which did not turn their troops into 
automatons, did not attempt to control everything from the top, and allowed 
subordinate commanders considerable latitude.”27  The German army under 
Ludendorff, by adopting these new tactics, set in motion a sequence of events 
that would change the way armies fought modern warfare. 
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Figure 8.   BELOW: German Stormtroopers sit at the base of Mt. Mrzli Vrh 
after the 1917 breakthrough.  BOTTOM: Lt. Erwin Rommel, facing 
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V. THE ISONZO FRONT 
The King of Italy has declared a war unto us.  The faith pledged to 
its two true allies has been broken by the Kingdom of Italy in a 
manner which in history remains as yet unheard of.  For more than 
thirty years there persisted an alliance, within which the Italian 
Kingdom was enabled to extend its domains and to thrive as it 
otherwise never would have deemed to be possible; yet in this 
perilous hour Italy has forsaken us and, with its banners unfolded, 
defected to camp with our foes. 28 
- Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph II, Manifesto, “To My Nations” 
 
A. UNREDEEMED ITALY 
On the eve of WWI, the Isonzo Valley was secure Austrian territory and 
had belonged to the House of Habsburg since the middle ages.  In 1914 the 
Isonzo River formed the western border of the Austrian Littoral, known as the 
province of Küstenland.29  It was one of the smallest of the Austrian holdings with 
just under one million subjects.  The Austrian Littoral encompassed two 
provinces, the provinces of Trieste and Istria.  Like the Austrian empire, the 
demographic breakdown of the Littoral was diverse: by language, 46 percent 
Italian, 21 percent Slovene, 21 percent Croatian, and only 2 percent German – 
Austrian.30  Geographically the region was as varied as the population.  In the 
north of the Isonzo Valley were the snow capped peaks of the Julian Alps where 
the Isonzo forms near the town of Villach.  In the South, only about ninety 
kilometers, is the sunny Adriatic and Trieste.  A bit further is the end of the Istrian 
Peninsula, including a number of its scenic islands – present day northern 
Croatia.   
It must be noted needs that a number of the locations, rivers, mountains, 
and towns of the region have multiple names.  This is explained by the diverse 
cultures and languages of the region.  Geographical names are discussed in 
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Appendix A, including the Italian, German, and Slovenian equivalents for easier 
present day reference.  For this thesis the names of locations, as they were in 
1914, are used.   
The capital, and largest city, of the province was the city of Trieste.  A 
natural port at the head of the Adriatic Sea, Trieste had for centuries been the 
main maritime outlet for the Habsburg Empire.  At the time of WWI it was the 
eighth busiest port on earth.31   The other city of the Austrian Littoral was the 
much smaller city of Gorizia about twenty five miles north of Trieste, on the east 
bank of the Isonzo.  Called the “City of Violets,” it was known mainly as a 
retirement home for Austrian Army officers.  At the southern tip of the Istrian 
peninsula was the third city of the region, Pola, and the headquarters of the 
Austrian fleet.  The rest of the Littoral was made up mainly of agricultural lands 
and small towns, much as it is today.  Heading north from Pola, along the Adriatic 
coast, are the towns of Pirano and Capodistria, before Trieste.  Around the tip of 
the Adriatic, just north of Trieste, the massive Miramare Castle sits on a jetty into 
the Adriatic.  Miramare was the home of Archduke Maxmilian, younger and ill-
fated brother of Emperor Franz Joseph, and his family.  Maxmilian would set sail 
for Mexico from Miramare Castle, but never return.  Continuing straight north 
from the castle, to the edges of Gorizia, is the region known as the “Carso” or 
“World of Rock.”  The Carso is a plateau of limestone with numerous depressions 
and crevasses.  There is little vegetation or growth of any kind and, at first look, 
the Carso appears as desolate and unique as the name implies.  Closer 
examination reveals within the depressions and crevasses plants can take root, 
mainly grape vines that produce the regions terrano wines.32  North of the Carso, 
between the limestone plateau and the beginning of the Julian Alps, lays the 
town of Gorizia.  A beautiful city, dating back to the Roman Era, Gorizia 
maintains a strategic position where the Isonzo flows out of the Alps and into the 
Friuli Plain before heading south to the Adriatic.  North along the Isonzo, against 
its current, standing at the mouth of a tremendous river gorge rises Mt. Sabotino 
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(2,010 ft.) to the west and Mt. Santo to the east (2,250 ft.).  The latter was 
particularly noted for a medieval monastery and Christian pilgrimage site at its 
peak overlooking Gorizia, and the entire lower Isonzo, known as Sveta Gora.   
Following the river further north and east from Gorizia the Isonzo snakes 
its way through the Kolovrat and Julian Alps.  Dotted with small towns along its 
banks, the cold emerald green water reaches the small, but strategic, Tolmino 
(Tolmin) bridgehead.  Tolmino, and its sister town and railhead St. Lucia (Most 
na Soc), would serve as the primary logistical hub for the Austro-Hungarian 
forces in the region.  Continuing north from Tolmino, about fifteen kilometers, the 
river reaches the second of three major bridgeheads at the quaint and idyllic 
town of Karfreit (Kobarid / Caporetto).  The towns of Karfreit and Tolmino at the 
base of Mt. Nero (Krn - 7,500 ft.) – one of the highest and most strategic Alpine 
peaks in the region – would become the geographic Achilles heel of the entire 
Italian Front.  The last major bridgehead along the Isonzo, before it disappears 
into the high Julian Alps, is the town of Flitsch (Plezzo / Bovec).  After Gorizia, 
Flitch was one of the largest cities on the Isonzo’s banks.  Flitsch sits at the base 
of the second highest mountain along the Isonzo, Mt. Rombon (7,287 ft.).  Italian 
commanders would develop what could only be described as an obsession with 
the capture of the high peaks overlooking the Isonzo.   
It was these mountains, towns, cities, coastal plains, and fertile river 
valleys that made up a significant portion of what the Italians called Italia 
Irredenta, or “Unredeemed Italy.”  In 1882, Rome, Vienna, and Berlin had formed 
the Triple Alliance, a defensive pact that bound the three states together 
militarily.  Italy, afraid of being diplomatically and militarily isolated, had thus 
allied herself with her traditional enemy, Austria.  The three powers even 
undertook considerable secret military planning to put Italian armies in the field 
alongside their former adversaries.33  The only possible way for Italy to gain Italia 
Irredenta was through military means as Austria would not give it up freely.  
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Therefore, when war broke out in 1914, Austria placed few troops along the 
Italian border.  What was the point of preparing for war on an ally?  
On July 31, 1914 the Italian cabinet decided in favor of neutrality in the 
upcoming conflict.  Immediate shockwaves could be felt across Europe as the 
balance of power appeared to have shifted to the Triple Entente of France, 
Britain, and Russia.  Germany and Austria were stunned by the betrayal, as was 
the Italian General Staff. On the same day the cabinet declared neutrality 
General Luigi Cadorna, chief of the Italian General Staff, had sent his war plan to 
King Vittorio Emanuele III.  The plan called for the immediate dispatch of an 
entire Italian field army to assist Germany against France.  Ironically, on August 
2nd – the day neutrality was officially declared – Vittorio Emanuele III approved 
Cadorna’s plan.   
General Luigi Cadorna was a poor choice of commander to lead Italy in 
the greatest war Europe had ever seen.  Within weeks of neutrality being 
declared, Cadorna was urging his government to declare war on Austria and 
attack it in its unprotected rear.  Cadorna’s urgings were only taken under 
advisement at the time, as the Italian army was not ready for war.  Italy had taken 
too long to prepare for the upcoming conflict and was going to be woefully behind 
the other combatants.  Neutrality gave Italy the time it needed.  Yet it wasn’t easy 
since Italy Italy had very few natural resources and lagged in industrialization.  As 
historian John R. Schindler writes in his book, Isonzo: 
Italy had depressingly few natural resources, and was 
overwhelmingly dependent on foreign fuels and raw materials; in a 
typical year, 90 percent of Italian coal was imported from Britain.  
Even the impressive increases in steel output amounted to little 
progress: Italy produced 90,000 tons of steel annually, whereas 
Germany and Austria together produced 20 million.  Economic 
weakness placed strong limits on Italy’s military potential.34 
 
Schindler goes on to describe the problems facing the leadership of the Italian 
army: 
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Unlike most other field armies in Europe, the Italian army had 
trouble recruiting intelligent, hardworking young men into the officer 
corps.  Too often it got those unsuitable for other professions who 
were interested neither in soldiering nor in their men.  Worse, the 
army tended to promote timeservers and bureaucrats to its highest 
ranks.  Former Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti noted on the eve of 
WWI, “The generals are worth little, they came up from the ranks at 
a time when families sent their most stupid sons into the army 
because they did not know what to do with them.35 
 
Cadorna was a bureaucratic timeserving general, worse than any other 
Chief of Staff commanding forces in the field.  He was sixty-four years old when 
he took command of the Italian army.  He came from a military family and 
attended all the right military schools and training academies.  Thus, he spent 
most of his career at headquarters or on staffs.  This meant he spent little time 
with field units and knew little of what actually goes on below the headquarters 
level.  He worked his way up through the ranks because of his connections in 
Rome, and made numerous enemies along the way.  He was cold, calculating, 
and very methodical in all that he did.  He was demanding and expected success 
from all who worked under him.  He dealt harshly with those who failed, or who 
criticized him.  For example, Cadorna court-martialed Giulio Douhet, commander 
of the first Italian Air Unit in 1915 and often credited as being the father of 
strategic bombing theory, for criticizing the conduct of the war.  Lover of anything 
Roman, Cadorna reinstated the ancient custom of decimation (one in ten would 
be picked out and shot) applying it to units who failed to accomplish their mission 
in combat.  In short, he represented all that was bad with the Italian officer corps.  
 
B. WAR ON THE “ISONZO FRONT” 1915 
Declaring neutrality did little to place Italy in a comfortable position among 
the warring parties of Europe.  Should the German and Austro-Hungarian 
alliance be successful, Italy would be faced with two very angry former allies its 
borders.  Italy, fearing this outcome, dispatched a secret courier to London to 
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explore the possibility of joining the cause of the Triple Entente, in exchange for 
territorial concessions – Italia Irredenta.  
On April 26, 1915, with the war going very badly for the Austrians in 
Russia and Serbia, Italy signed the Treaty of London committing her to an 
invasion of Austria in one month’s time.  By the end of May, Italy’s fourteen army 
corps were readying for the invasion of Austria.  Ten months after declaring 
neutrality, Italy was going to war against the Habsburg Empire.   
Italy joined the Allied cause in the spring of 1915 for two reasons: 1) an 
Allied guarantee of support and 2) the national desire to “liberate” what the 
Italians felt were traditionally their lands.  Because ethnic Italians predominated 
in terms of numbers, many Italians felt that Austria did not have the ancestral 
right to those lands.  Joining the Allied cause came as quite a shock, not only to 
the governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but to the planners of the 
Italian military.   
The last thing the armies of the Habsburg Empire needed was another 
front to defend.  Already struggling against Russia in the Carpathian Mountains, 
where nearly all of its fighting forces were positioned, five armies with fifty-three 
infantry divisions and eight cavalry divisions36 were on the verge of collapse.  In 
Serbia, a much smaller foe in all respects, little progress towards victory was 
being accomplished.  The army was short of everything from modern weapons, 
especially artillery, to supplies and even manpower.  Russian prisoners of war 
were used to build everything from trenches to roads in an effort to supply the 
Habsburg army.  The shortage of manpower was a result of both size and ethnic 
makeup and lack of adequate funding to train large groups of reserves.  A cross 
section of one hundred soldiers in the Habsburg army would break-down to 
twenty-five Germans, twenty-three Hungarians or Magyars, thirteen Czechs, nine 
Serbs or Croats, eight each Polish and Ukrainians, seven Romanians, four 
Slovaks, two Slovenes, and one Italian.37 
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The head of the Habsburg General Staff was General Conrad von 
Hötzendorf.  A progressive individual and very intelligent, Hötzendorf was highly 
regarded and respected among the officer corps.  In his “Summation of the 
Situation at the Beginning of the Year 1914,” Conrad concluded that the time for 
preventive war had passed.  After the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, he mobilized his army for battle according to well laid plans, but he 
faced the impending war with resignation, even fatalism.  He wrote, “It will be a 
hopeless struggle, but nevertheless it must be, because such an ancient 
monarchy and such an ancient army cannot perish ingloriously.”38 
The Habsburg army entered the war early in 1914 against Serbia, hoping 
to wholly defeat the small peasant power quickly so it could focus on the Russian 
problem in the East.  The Serbian army, mostly comprised of recent combat 
veterans of the Balkan Wars, inflicted defeat after defeat on the Austrian forces.  
By the end of the year, little progress had been made and even worse news was 
coming from the Russian Front.  In the Carpathians, the Russians were 
threatening to break through the Habsburg defenses around Galicia, opening a 
highway into the heart of Habsburg territory.  As 1914 drew to a close the 
Austrian casualties were immense.  Its army had lost 1.2 million men killed, 
wounded, or missing.   
1915 would not start out better for the Habsburg Empire.  The army was 
being rebuilt with any men available and shipped immediately to the Russian 
Front.  By late-March the mighty fortress of Przemysl, one of the last Austrian 
strongholds, was forced to surrender.  More than 110,000 men and 2,500 officers 
would be forced into Russian captivity.  The Russians went back on the offensive 
immediately, but were unable to turn their tactical victories into strategic 
successes.  The Habsburg army was able to survive because the Russians were 
equally as weakened, battered, and depleted as their opponents. 
With the entrance of Italy into the fray, Austria had very few battalions, let 
alone divisions, to spare.  Italy constituted, only days before, a neutral border and 
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was consequently very low priority for Austrian commanders.  The Isonzo Valley 
had been quiet since the outbreak of war, even more quiet than usual, as most of 
the men were off fighting on foreign fronts.  Italy’s move to join the Allies and 
subsequent mobilization did not go unnoticed by Austrian intelligence.  Conrad, 
growing increasingly upset and concerned by the Italian military moves, wired his 
German counterpart Falkenhayn asking to withdraw seven divisions from the 
Carpathians for deployment to the Isonzo.  Falkenhayn refused.  So, the 
Austrians were forced to make due with what they could again scrape together.  
By mid-May, the entire Littoral including the Isonzo Valley was garrisoned by 
three under-strength divisions.  The divisions had little in the way of modern 
weaponry and even fewer, if any, artillery pieces.  The day Italy declared war, the 
entire line from Mt. Nero to the Adriatic, a distance of thirty-five miles, was held 
by just twenty-four Austrian battalions, 25,000 rifles supported by 100 guns.39   If 
Cadorna was going to “walk to Vienna” as he proposed, then there was little 
Austrian defense to prevent him.   
The day the Italians officially entered the war, May 23, 1915 Cadorna’s 
army was already mobilized and ready for combat.  Months of secret preparation 
had gone smoothly.  His force, on paper at least, was impressive.  Counting 
second-line reserves, the army included thirty-five infantry divisions, a dozen 
divisions of militia, and four cavalry divisions, as well as a division of Bersaglieri, 
elite light infantry.  There were also fifty-two battalions of Alpini, crack mountain 
troops and fourteen battalions of combat engineers.  The field artillery boasted 
467 batteries, almost 2,000 guns and howitzers.40  In nearly, almost one million 
men were ready for combat.  Like the armies of the other combatants ten months 
before, the Italians marched to the Isonzo Valley in high spirits and enthusiasm. 
Cadorna set up his staff headquarters in the city of Udine, about twenty 
kilometers behind the forward lines.  About this time a combined German-
Habsburg offensive opened in Galicia on the Russian Front.  Nearly one dozen 
German divisions attacked on a front less than twenty miles, pushing the Russian 
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3rd Army into retreat.  At the same time, an Austrian counterattack in the 
Carpathian Mountains allowed the recapturing of the fortress at Przemysl by 
early June.  By the end of the month most of the lost territory was back in 
Habsburg hands.  The Russians suffered unimaginable losses in the late-Spring 
of 1915, and all other Allied gains had been erased.  With the threat of Russian 
victory removed, Austria could now focus on the Isonzo.   
On May 23rd, when victory was close in the east, Austria immediately 
dispatched two numbered Corps, the XV and the XVI, from Serbia to the Italian 
frontier.  These two corps constituted more than forty veteran mountain 
battalions.  Conrad also created a new command, the 5th Army, responsible for 
the Isonzo and Littoral regions.  He appointed General Svetozar Boroević von 
Bojna, “Bosco,” to run the 5th Army.   
The fifty-eight year old general was born the son of a Serbian Grenzer 
family from Croatia.  The Habsburg Army’s Grenzer regiments had defended the 
empire’s southern border against the Ottomans since the early sixteenth century.  
Until its disbandment in 1881, the unique Military Border, as it was known, 
provided the Habsburgs with their fiercest soldiers, wild Serbian and Croatian 
irregulars renowned for their loyalty to the emperor and their brutality toward all 
foes.  He had spent his entire life serving Emperor Franz Joseph.41  
A professional officer and strict disciplinarian, Boroević would not tolerate 
failure.  Unlike Cadorna, Boroević was a respected field commander and had 
earned the respect of the men he commanded.  His strict policies of not giving 
one foot of ground to Italian attackers without a tough fight consistently 
confounded Italian generals in the early offensives.  Boroević’s men exhibited 
much higher morale than their Italian counterparts.  For the Habsburg soldiers, 
they were defending their homeland against a hated enemy; especially after 
feeling stabbed in the back just a few months earlier by Italy’s declaration of war. 
The first Italian offensive began in the last days of May of 1915.  The army 
advanced quickly into the upper Isonzo Valley (Figure 9) without much of a fight.  
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The Austrian defenders, now nearly twice as numerous as a few weeks prior, 
had decided to make their stand in the high Julian Alps.  These, the Austrian 
army knew, were precisely the mountain peaks the Italians needed to take.   
Meanwhile, the Italian army did manage to take Karfreit and the mountain 
peaks of Vrata (6,400ft) and Vršič (6,260ft), in the North of the Mrzli range 
(Figure 10), without much opposition, giving them a foothold over the Isonzo.  
The Austrian defenders did not have enough time to fortify all the peaks by the 
end of May.   
The Italians however did not rush into the central and southern Mrzli 
(Figure 11).  This allowed the Habsburg armies’ time to fortify and reinforce their 
key positions.  Boroević now ordered his men to hold them at all costs.  Casualty 
rates were about to rise.  The Italian army needed to take Mt. Nero next, the 
strategic importance of which cannot be understated.  The highest peak in the 
chain, the top of Nero provided a clear view of every position from Flitsch to the 
Adriatic on a clear day.  The Italians attempted numerous attacks on Nero’s peak 
in the first two weeks of June, 1915, but suffered heavy casualties from its 
Hungarian defenders.  At times, the defenders only had to roll heavy boulders 
down onto the attacking Italians.  Nonetheless, by June 16th the peak was firmly 
in Italian hands.  Yet, the quick capture of Mt. Nero infected the Italians with a 
degree of overconfidence.  More to the point, these early gains would be the only 
victories the Italians would achieve for the next year.  The Mrzli range had yet to 
be conquered.  Only three peaks and one bridgehead were under Italian control.   
The Habsburg army was entrenched on Mt. Batognica, the neighboring 
peak to Nero (Figure 12), and still controlled the southern third of the Mrzli range.  
All along the Isonzo Valley the Italians would find digging out heavily entrenched, 
veteran Austrian units, to be difficult and costly.  Italians would report 13,500 
casualties in the first offensive; the Austrians 10,000.  In reality, the numbers 
were more likely 30,000 Italian and 20,000 Austrian, as neither army were 
particularly “accurate” in the reporting of casualties.  The first offensive set the 
tone for the next ten Italian offensives and highlighted the deficiencies in its 
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commander and chief, Cadorna.  His blindness to the realities of the modern 
battlefield doomed his armies to fight with men against steel and fire.  
Enthusiasm and courage weighed little against well entrenched machine guns.42  
The Italians would attempt three more offensives along the Isonzo in 
1915.  The Second Offensive began on or about July 18, 1915.  The main focus 
of the attack was the region known as the “Carso” south of Tolmino, around the 
city of Gorizia.  Supporting wings attacked in the south and north, but again 
Cadorna insisted on massed frontal assaults and few gains were made.  
Insufficient artillery supplies and increased Habsburg reinforcements forced 
Cadorna to call it off in early August.   
Habsburg forces began digging deep caverns into the stony mountains 
and hillsides (Figure 13).  The natural limestone of the Isonzo Valley made 
suitable shelter from the heavy Italian artillery.  These caverns, blasted and cut 
by thousands of engineers and Russian prisoners of war, would be the savior of 
the Habsburg defenders.  The casualties continued to mount to nearly 50,000 on 
each side.  In response, Italy and Cadorna called up more classes of reservists 
to fill in the ranks. 
Following the Second Offensive, Cadorna gave his men a much needed 
break, not because he felt they deserved it, but because he wanted more artillery 
and men added to the lines.  The Austrians used Cadorna’s six-week delay to 
further strengthen their defensive positions.  Italian forces were only twenty miles 
from Trieste and Boroević knew he had to hold everywhere, to prevent it falling to 
the Italians.   
The Third Offensive began much as the first two, with massed assaults 
and heavy artillery bombardments from the Italian lines.  The focus was the city 
of Gorizia and the Julian Alp fortifications of Boroević. The Italians wanted to 
remove any threat from its left flank before it advanced on Trieste.   
Austrian signals intelligence, the only country besides France with such 
tactical units, rendered first-rate service to Boroević and his commanders.  They 
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were reading the Italian playbook along with the Italian commanders.  
Consistently, the signal units intercepted Italian message traffic of an upcoming 
offensive.  The Habsburg 5th Army knew in remarkable detail every facet of the 
Italian order of battle.  To compound matters, the Italian army didn’t hide their 
movements very well and preparations for every offensive were easily visible to 
Austrian observers.   
The Third Offensive was called off on November 4th.  This offensive cost 
Cadorna nearly 67,000 more casualties. In reality the numbers were much 
greater.  Italian soldiers fought bravely, but the brutal tactics of its Commander in 
Chief led to what Benito Mussolini, a veteran of the Third Offensive, termed 
“those days of extreme hardship” on the upper Isonzo.43  The 5th Army was as 
devastated by the Third Offensive as the Italian forces suffered almost 42,000 
casualties.  The Austrians were holding, but could not hold out against the 
continued offensives of the Italians for an extended period of time.  The 
manpower advantage still lay in the Italian corner – and Cadorna knew this. 
On November 9, 1915 the Italian commander would send his forces into 
the breech one last time before the alpine winter reached full furry.  After only a 
weeks rest, the Italian artillery opened up along the entire front signaling the 
beginning of the Fourth Offensive.  The men once again rose from their trenches 
in thick lines, attempting frontal assaults on the well entrenched Austrian 
defenders on the high ground.  While fighting raged for two weeks around 
Gorizia, many Italian Alpine units waited for the weather in the high Julian Alps to 
clear so they could start their offensive.  Meanwhile, snow and rain made it near 
impossible to stay dry and men began to freeze.   
Three long weeks after the massive Fourth Offensive opened, on 
November 25, the alpine portion of front was able to begin operations.  But by 
November 28 the fighting in the mountains was over.  Winter in its most severe  
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form had arrived.  Fighting ended the next day around Gorizia, located a bit 
further south and in the warmer plain, and by December 1 the lines fell 
completely silent.   
The Fourth Offensive, and 1915, was over.  The Fourth Offensive cost the 
Italians, unofficially, almost 50,000 more casualties bringing its total for the year 
to nearly 230,000 of its finest soldiers.  The net gain was a few small villages, 
some trenches, and a couple of mountain peaks won early on.  The Austrians 
lost 25,000 soldiers in the Fourth Offensive and nearly 100,000 in the last two 
combined.  Yet, they still held their positions. 
 
Figure 9.   Upper Isonzo Valley from Mt. Batognica.  Karfreit (Caporetto) is the 
town in the center of the valley in front of the lower ridge.  Tolmino is 
directly left of the edge of this picture.  Flitsch and Mt. Rombon are barely 
visible at the top of the picture.  The mountain directly across the valley is 






Figure 10.   Mt. Vršič and Mt. Vrata, in the distance, from Mt. Batognica in the 









Figure 12.   Mt. Nero (Krn) from Batognica. 
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C. THE END OF THE BEGINNING, 1916 
Throughout 1916 the Western Front was faced with the grim reality of the 
Verdun Campaign.  Falkenhayn’s plan to “bleed the French army white” was 
producing casualties and expending supplies at a machine’s pace.  Meanwhile, 
along the Isonzo, 1916 opened much the same as 1915, quietly.  The armies 
were merely waiting for the spring thaw, after one of the worst winters in 
decades, to renew hostilities.  The French Commander-in-Chief, Joseph Joffre, 
was placing pressure on the allies to open offensives in order to reduce pressure 
on the French at Verdun.  The Habsburg armies were dug in, much the same as 
the Germans in the west, with the hopes of bleeding the Italians white.  Cadorna 
would oblige his ally Joffre (Figure 15). 
Cadorna would initiate five offensives during the year.  In response, the 
Austrians would be successful throughout the year at inflicting hundreds of 
thousands of Italian casualties, while giving up minimal amounts of Habsburg 
territory.  There was one exception; in August of 1916 the Austrian defenders 
would be forced to surrender Gorizia after days of grueling defense.   
On March 12, the Fifth Offensive began as the spring thaw was beginning.  
Cadorna had done little to strengthen his army over the winter.  The Italians were 
no more ready to fight in 1916 than at the end of 1915.  Cadorna had been 
baptized in modern warfare over the last year, but still failed to adapt to the 
changing nature of warfare.  Trench warfare had emerged on the banks of the 
Isonzo with a vengeance, a development that even Cadorna could not fail to 
notice.  The possibility of rapid battles of maneuver he had hoped for was gone.  
Italy was now committed to fighting a long, siege-like war of attrition against 
Austria.  The strong entrenchments, barbed wire, machine guns and ample 
artillery that covered the Isonzo valley removed all possibility of maneuvering for 
advantage.44  The Fifth Offensive would be over quickly.  By March 17, 1916 
Cadorna was forced to call off the half-hearted offensive due to weather and the 
threat of a new Austrian attack from the Tyrol region at Italy’s northern border  
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around Trentino.  Fighting continued sporadically along the Isonzo for the next 
few months when Cadorna was finally able to successfully launch his next 
offensive.  
Up until this point in the war, gas had not been used on the Isonzo Front.  
In June 1916 this changed.  Austrian forces unleashed their first phosgene attack 
on Italian lines with horrific effect.  Italian forces along Mt. San Michelle were not 
prepared for the use of gas.  When the combine artillery and phosgene attack hit, 
those that could run did so with a new fear.  The others suffocated in their 
trenches.  Almost 7,000 perished in the attack and the Austrians barely recorded 
any casualties overrunning the Italian position.  The attack would have lasting 
effects on the Italian soldiers.  The sight of thousands of comrades drowned in 
the trenches from phosgene would resonate through the entire army.  Italian 
soldiers became noticeably less likely to accept prisoners from this point on.  
This event may have motivated them to victory two months later in the Sixth 
Offensive. 
August brought the most successful Italian offensive of the entire year, 
arguably the entire campaign.  The Sixth Offensive saw the capture of the city of 
Gorizia; one full year after hostilities had begun.  The front was pushed forward 
five kilometers along a twenty kilometer stretch on the Carso.  The loss of Gorizia 
was significant for the Austrian forces defending the upper Isonzo Valley in that it 
was a major logistical hub and bridgehead into the center of the Austrian 
defenses.  Only one significant logistical point remained along the Isonzo not in 
Italian hands, Tolmino.  Austrian counterattacks limited the Italian gains to little 
else of significance.   
The capture of Gorizia gave Italian forces a tremendous morale boost and 
gave Cadorna and his commanders the impetus they needed to continue 
offensive action with the hopes of capitalizing on the increased spirit of their 
soldiers.  As Verdun was showing on the Western Front, spirit and élan can only 
go so far against heavily entrenched forces, machine guns, and heavy artillery.  
Casualties were again high.  Cadorna lost nearly 100,000 soldiers in the one 
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week offensive.  The capture of Gorizia alone cost the Italians nearly 30,000 
casualties, a number equal to the pre-war population of the town itself!  The 
Austrian casualties, while less numerous, were significant, nearly 50,000 
casualties and 8,000 prisoners of war. 
The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Offensives closed out 1916 much the 
same way it was opened – with Italian forces unable to dislodge Austrian 
defenders in attack after attack.  Each was mainly a continuation of the previous 
offensives. The Seventh Offensive, September 14-17, was an attempt to 
capitalize on the successes of the Sixth Offensive.  Most attacks focused around 
the Gorizia bridgehead.  Heavy casualties once again forced Cadorna to call off 
the offensive rather quickly.  The Eighth Offensive, October 10-12, was shorter 
than its predecessor, but the goals were the same.  Cadorna wanted to extend 
the left flank far enough to protect the right flank in an all-out push for Trieste.   
The final offensive of 1916, the Ninth, was attempted before the alpine 
winter set in.  On November 1st the Italian forces made one last push to extend 
the foothold they had gained around Gorizia to the Tolmino bridgehead.  As 
before, stiff defense from the Austrians (Figure 14) and heavy Italian casualties 
forced Cadorna to call off the offensive by the 4th of November.  Nevertheless, on 
the Carso, the Ninth Offensive did get the Italians two miles closer to Trieste; 
however the Austrian hold on the Carso was in no way threatened.  Casualties 
for the last three offensives of 1916 soared to more than 150,000 for the Italians 
and 100,000 (counting the sick) for the Austrians.   
With the Brusilov Offensive in Russia drawing more and more resources 
from the Austrian manpower coffers, Cadorna’s strategy of pouring thousands of 
men into the breech, over and over again, was beginning to have an effect on the 
Habsburg forces.  Fewer and fewer supplies and reinforcements were available 
to replace the casualties on the front lines.  The Italians were successful at 
replacing men and supplies at a much faster rate than their Austrian 
counterparts.  Boroević was able to apply band-aid fixes time and time again, but 
he knew that without outside assistance that his army couldn’t hold out 
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indefinitely (Figure 15).  The assistance he looked for – namely German – was 
far from coming to fruition.  He would have to continue to hold with the forces 
available to him.  With Verdun in the West, Russia, Rumania, and Serbia still fully 
involved in the East, little aid was available for Boroevič and his beleaguered 5th 
Army along the Isonzo. 
 
Figure 13.   Austrian forces dug deep caverns, kavernen, into the mainly 
limestone geography throughout the Isonzo Valley.  The limestone 
caverns provided adequate shelter from Italian heavy artillery and the 




Figure 14.   Alpine winter and Austrian troops in the trenches in 1916. 
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Figure 15.   TOP: General Luigi Cadorna.  BOTTOM: General Boroevič (seated 
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VI. THE SWEET SMELL OF VICTORY 
Most of the men in the [Italian] trenches were very young, thinly 
clad and feeling the cold intensely and they had been left in the line 
for a long period without relief. Many of them were weeping and 
some had ice on their faces: the conducting officer said that three 
or four of them were frozen to death nightly. As winter was coming 
on fast and conditions in the Austrian ranks, higher in the 
mountains and with the Alpine hinterland behind them, were much 
worse. 45 
- Lt.Col. Pitt-Taylor 
British Army General Staff-Italy 
December 1917, Monte Grappa 
 
A. RUSSIA 
On the Eastern Front, warfare continued to resemble the “mobile” nature 
the German General Staff desired on the Western Front.  Against the Russian 
Army, the Central Powers continued on the offensive; coordinating infantry 
advance and artillery operation so that the guns moved in sync with the infantry.  
The Central Powers had advanced nearly three hundred kilometers by the end of 
June 1915, and had ground down the Russian army to near exhaustion. 
Throughout 1916 and 1917, the East became a testing ground for the new 
tactical innovations being developed within the German Army and General Staff.  
The coordination of attack by infantry and artillery succeeded in breaking through 
Russian positions time after time.  Rolling artillery bombardments, infantry and 
artillery coordination, and tactics emphasizing the offensive had proven to 
German commanders in the East the value of surprise.  The concentration of 
superior forces against weak spots in enemy lines, and the deep penetration of 
each weak spot in order to encircle a portion of the enemy force proved 
consistently effective. 
The chief of staff of the German Gorlice operation against Russia was 
Colonel Hans von Seekt, recognized by his colleagues as one of the more 
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outstanding soldiers of his generation.  He later became famous as the post-war 
rebuilder of the German army, and on the Eastern Front he performed very well 
against the Russians, who during early 1916 pressed the Central Powers hard.46  
Ultimately, with the failure of the Brusilov Offensive late in 1916 and the fall of 
Riga in September 1917, the Russians were broken and essentially out of the 
war.  Nonetheless, for a while things were touch-and-go due to a new combatant. 
 
B. RUMANIA 
The success of the Brusilov Offensive encouraged Rumania, with her big 
army, to enter the war on August 27, 1916, on the side of the Allied powers.  The 
Allied grand strategy hoped that with the Austro-Hungarian and German forces 
spread thin and weakened by fighting on so many fronts, that a combined 
Russian-Rumanian push in the East would break the back of Germany’s 
strongest ally.  At the time Lloyd George noted, “Rumania may be the turning 
point of the campaign.  If the Germans fail there it will be the greatest disaster 
inflicted upon them.  But should Germany succeed, I hesitate to think what the 
effect will be on the fortunes of our campaign.”47  Less than four months after 
declaring war, the Rumanian army had been defeated. 
Germany had anticipated such a move by Rumania before the declaration 
of war.  South of Rumania, German General Mackensen had put together an 
army of Bulgarians and Turks, mixed with some German regiments.  In 
Transylvania, the demoted Falkenhayn would quickly form two armies and was 
quickly ready to march.  Rumania would have been wise to fortify and entrench; 
instead, it split its army.  One large force would go after Falkenhayn in 
Transylvania while the other went south to harass the rear of Mackensen’s 
forces.  One Rumanian medical officer described the fighting in this way: 
The mountain we climbed was a mountain of blindness and death.  
From the eastern slope, where the battle was not yet decided, wild 
cries rang through the rattle of musketry; and up here, in the                                             
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position we had captured, the enemy were wreaking their 
vengeance on the conquerors.  Like a swarm of hornets the shells 
dashed against the rocks, tearing the flesh from the limbs of the 
living and the dead . . . One [German] had brought back a 
gramophone with him from the Rumanian lines; now an idea 
suddenly struck him, he placed it on a stone and set it going, the 
page in Figaro began to sing, and like the voice of a mad soul 
Mozart’s music rose in a world of ruin.48 
Erwin Rommel, in the assessment of his units operations against a Rumanian 
detachment near Gagesti, foreshadowed the tactics his unit would use almost a 
year later to rout a new enemy, the Italians, at Caporetto: 
Efficient use could be made of smoke screens.  Initially, the enemy 
would maintain a heavy fire into the smoke, but his inability to 
achieve definite results would oblige him to suspend firing.  This 
would be the moment to begin disengaging operations.  To 
deceive, divert, and pin the enemy down . . . we launched an attack 
in the fog against an enemy of unknown strength, we placed our 
heavy machine guns well forward and their fire soon cleared the 
enemy from the ridge.  Romanian reserves were such that they 
were without communication forward and they had neglected to 
post security elements.  Because of this, Lieb’s detachment had 
little difficulty in surprising and dispersing this strong enemy force.49 
The Rumanians built fortifications to block any offensive taken by the 
Germans and Austrians.  The strongest fortification, at Turtukai, was claimed by 
the Rumanian commander to be their Verdun.  It was 1916 and the battle for 
Verdun was still raging in the West.  A day after making the statement, 
September 6th, 1916, the fort had fallen, with hardly a shot being fired, and the 
armies of the Central Powers began spreading out into the mountainous 
Rumanian terrain.  Soon the armies of the Central Powers would be at the 
doorstep of Bucharest.  On December 6th 1916, Bucharest fell and Rumania was 
forced to surrender.  The Allied plan had collapsed.  Greece opted out of the war 
and surrendered to the Bulgarians; and the Serbians were all but contained in the 
Balkans.  With Russia, Rumania, Serbia, and Greece defeated, Germany could 
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now send reinforcements to the west.  The stage was now set for what could be 
described as Germany’s crowning achievement of WWI. 
 
C. ISONZO FRONT, 1917  
After nearly eighteen months and nine offensives on the Isonzo, the 
Italians had managed to capture one Austrian town, which was a shell of a town 
after all the artillery bombardments.  The Allied commanders met in the winter of 
1917 to discuss and coordinate a new strategy for victory.  The French and 
British commanders asked Cadorna for an offensive against the Habsburg 
forces. Cadorna had used the winter of 1917 to strengthen his army, but was 
skeptical of any breakthrough of Austrian lines.  Lloyd George promised Cadorna 
numerous divisions and heavy artillery from the Western Front, but the French 
and British commanders were unimpressed with Italian military performance thus 
far and balked at the offer.  The Isonzo was in the midst of a harsh winter and an 
early offensive would have to be delayed.  Cadorna prepared his army 
throughout the winter and early spring.  His plan was familiar.  After heavy 
bombardment his troops would attack first around Gorizia, and then attempt a 
breakthrough on the Carso.  The ultimate goal was Trieste. 
The Austrian 5th Army was at its strongest in the spring of 1917.  The long 
rest allowed all the trenches from Flitsch to the Adriatic to be rebuilt, and the 
army was now comprised of more than eighteen divisions and 1,500 guns; 
double its size when fighting began in 1915.  The Austrians knew from their 
intelligence that a new offensive was being planned, but they had no idea of the 
timing.   
At dawn on May 12, 1917 the Tenth Offensive began with the largest 
artillery bombardment yet witnessed on the Isonzo.  Over 2,150 guns and 1,000 
mortars punished the Austrian positions throughout the 12th and 13th.  On May 14 
the Army of Gorizia, a new Italian army specially created by Cadorna for the 
Tenth Offensive, was ready to attack.  The first phase of the attack brought 
Italian armies some success forward of Gorizia.  The capture of the Plava 
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bridgehead and the mountain peaks of Kuk and Vodice along the Isonzo’s 
western shore, opposite Tolmino, were victories that had eluded the Italians for 
nearly two years.  Tolmino however would not fall.   
On May 23, the second phase along the Carso’s eleven mile front opened.  
Again, 1,250 guns and 600 mortars pounded the Austrian trenches.  By the time 
the barrage was over at 4 P.M. the 3rd Italian Army had unleashed a million 
artillery shells at the Austrians, twenty shells for every foot of the front.50  Initial 
advances were at first very successful in overrunning the Austrian lines, but the 
inevitable counterattacks always seemed to push the Italians back.  By May 28, 
Cadorna was forced to call off the second phase of the Tenth Offensive with only 
modest gains on the Carso.   
Both armies suffered near 60 percent casualties in the Tenth Offensive.  
Nearly 90,000 Austrian troops were lost from the overall 165,000 rifle strength.  
Worse, the numbers included 24,000 prisoners of war, by far the largest number 
taken yet on the Isonzo.  The Italians suffered 160,000 casualties in the offensive 
with 3,000 more prisoners of war.  Both armies were near exhaustion.  Cadorna 
too was facing a severe morale crisis within his army.  Boroević was relieved that 
Cadorna had called off the offensive when he did because he feared his army 
could not hold out very much longer. 
In the summer following the Tenth Offensive Cadorna sent six new 
divisions into the lines.  This gave Cadorna 1.2 million men and nearly 5,200 
artillery pieces at his disposal.  Against only twenty Austrian divisions and 1,500 
guns, Cadorna was sure he would now crack what remained of Boroević’s 5th 
Army (Figure 16).  On August 18 the Italian artillery barrage began.  It was the 
last Italian offensive of 1917. 
Upwards of 5,000 artillery pieces cascaded fire down upon the Austrian 
trenches from Mrzli Vrh to the Adriatic.  The next day Italian forces rose from the 
trenches and assaulted the Austrian lines.  On the Carso, Italian gains were 
modest, but the Austro-Hungarian line was continuously being pushed back.  In 
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the north, Italian gains were more substantial.  The 2nd Army captured ten 
kilometers of ground from the Austrian’s.  Indeed the Italian advance was so 
successful in capturing the Bainsizza Plateau, south-east of Tolmino, that the 
army outran its artillery and supply lines.  Thus, the Italians were forced to stop; 
allowing the Habsburg forces a chance to regroup and reinforce their positions.  
Had the Italians been able to continue the assault, there would have been little 
the Austrian forces could have done to stop them.   
The advance of six miles on an eleven mile front was significant by WWI 
standards.  Nevertheless, the Austro-Hungarian line ultimately held, but they had 
paid a high cost in casualties (Figure 17).  Cadorna’s attack was abandoned on 
September 12, 1917.  Italy conceded 166,000 soldiers lost in its last offensive, 
while the Austrians suffered 110,000 casualties.  Ironically, had there been 
another Italian attack the Austrian 5th Army would not have held.  The Habsburg 
Army needed help, and quick, if it was going to keep the Italian forces at bay.  
Without additional men and supplies from their German ally, the line along the 
Isonzo would crack and Cadorna would finally have had his “walk to Vienna.”   
It was at this time when German senior leadership realized the 
seriousness of the situation, and the developing problem.  Planning was again 
begun, this time to find a way to aid the Austro-Hungarian forces against Italy.  A 
Habsburg defeat along the Isonzo, at the hands of the Italian forces, may very 
well have forced Austria into a negotiated surrender.  This was a situation 
Germany could not afford.  Conversely, a German-Habsburg victory along the 
Isonzo would knock Italy out of the war secure the southern approaches into 
Germany and Austria.  Moreover, victory would open up a southern route for 








Figure 16.   “5,000 guns and 51 divisions.”  The red dots on the map 














Figure 17.   After the 11th Offensive Austrian soldiers were broken and their 
leadership believed they would not be able to withstand one more 
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VII. THE BATTLE OF CAPORETTO 
I came to within 150 yards of the enemy!  Suddenly the mass 
began to move and, in the ensuing panic, swept its resisting officers 
along downhill.  Most of the soldiers threw their weapons away and 
hundreds hurried to me.  In an instant I was surrounded and 
hoisted on Italian soldiers.  ”Evviva Germania!” [“Long Live 
Germany”] sounded from a thousand throats.  An Italian officer who 
hesitated to surrender was shot down by his own troops.  For the 
Italians on Mrzli peak the war was over.  They shouted with joy. 51 
- Lieutenant Erwin Rommel 
October 25, 1917, Mt. Matajur  
 
A. GERMANY ARRIVES 
Until the summer of 1917 the war between Italy and Austria-Hungary had 
not been much more than an obstruction on Germany’s military maps.  For two 
years the Italian and Habsburg armies had fought eleven terrible battles against 
each other along the mountainous border separating them.  The result had been 
minor gains by the Italians at the cost of millions of casualties to both sides.  But 
now the Austro-Hungarian army appeared on the verge of collapse at the hands 
of the Italian armies and their Commando Supremo, Luigi Cadorna.  His 
“attritionist” tactics had begun to pay dividends by the end of the summer of 
1917, as the Austrians were on the verge of collapsing along the Isonzo. 
Aware of the potential for strategic disaster, Germany would now take 
notice and send reinforcements to aid their beleaguered ally.  Not all of the 
German troops leaving the East and heading west would go to France and 
Belgium.  A few select formations – three infantry divisions and their assault 
counterparts, and the elite Alpine Corps, including Rommel’s Württemberg 
Battalion, were sent south to the Italian Alps.  There they joined by three infantry 
divisions, each with Assault Detachments, from the West.  A newly formed Jäger 
Division would also be sent, in preparation for the upcoming combined 
German/Austro-Hungarian counteroffensive.  The place chosen by the high 
command for the attack was the valley of the Isonzo River. 
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This was a perfect choice for the upcoming offensive.  The mountains on 
either side of the river are as high as any along the front.  There were far fewer 
peaks than anywhere else in the Julian Alps.  Many of the valleys north and 
south of Karfreit run east to west into the Isonzo Valley.  These would make great 
highways for any attacker and would allow good covering fire from artillery on the 
peaks above.   
The arriving divisions were organized and assigned to the 14th Army under 
the command of Otto Von Below, a veteran commander of the operations in the 
East under Ludendorff.  He wouldn’t change tactics in Italy. Assault troops were 
to play the decisive role in the pending offensive. 
Throughout September and October of 1917, the troops assigned to the 
14th Army arrived under thick operational security.  Movements occurred only at 
night and most forces stayed completely out of sight of Italian observation flights 
and outposts.  Many units were kept far enough behind the lines to be brought up 
days before the offensive.   
A systematic training program was then set in motion by each division, 
including mock attacks, long training marches in the thin mountain air, and 
familiarization in assault tactics and mountain combat.  In addition, the Assault 
Battalions would be using a new weapon, the Maxim 08/15 light machine gun.  
While not the first light machine gun of the war, it packed the same firepower and 
as its more recognized heavy machine gun cousin.  The critical advantage was 
that the Maxim 08/15 could be carried by a single stormtrooper (Figure 18). 
Although stretched along an extensive line, the force facing the Germans 
was impressive.  In spite of the fact that Cadorna had not fully replaced the 
300,000 casualties from the last two Italian offensives, the Italians still had more 
than one million men on the line.  Even more impressive, they had nearly double 
the two thousand artillery pieces the combined German and Austrian forces 




intelligence and aircraft flying over Italian positions were able to find, and 
precisely locate, most of the Italian artillery and strong points prior to the 
offensive.  
 
Figure 18.   German Stormtroopers training with the Maxim 08/15 light machine 




The Italians wrongly assumed that by October 1917 it would be too late in 
the year for the Central Powers to mount any kind of large scale offensive in the 
mountainous terrain of the Isonzo Valley.  The Italians knew the Austrians were 
near breaking and were virtually unaware of any German reinforcements.  The 
Austrians had not mounted even a single offensive along the Isonzo; not even to 
take back the accumulative territory they had lost.  The Italians, unlike the 
previous two winters, this one was turning out to be rather mild by comparison.  
Italian forces were poorly dug in following the Eleventh Offensive.  Their 
positions, including artillery, were easily spotted.  Even Cadorna had retired from 
the field for a short vacation, returning just two days before the offensive was to 
begin.  He did not realize that his army was in mortal danger.  By the time he did, 
it was too late.  Most orders to prepare for an Austrian counter offensive were 
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either taken by commanders in the field and ignored, or carried out to the least 
extent possible.  Only a few units on the Italian line were prepared for the 
onslaught that was about to come crashing through. 
It was an intelligence failure of staggering proportions.53  At 0200 on the 
morning of October 24, 1917, all available guns, howitzers, and trench mortars 
began firing a combination of artillery shells, including gas (Figure 19). Whole 
Italian platoons were killed.  The sentries often succumbed too quickly to wake 
those asleep and the sleeping died where they lay.  Where soldiers had decent 
gas masks, namely the artillerymen, their unprotected ammunition mules and 
sled dogs were killed. 
Caught off guard by the bombardment, Italian counterbattery fire was 
sporadic and inaccurate.  From Tolmino to Flitsch the first assault forces began 
to move into the trenches preparing for attack.  German stormtroopers from all 
the divisions of the 14th Army, along with their Austrian counterparts, moved into 
place with mortars, flame throwers, light and heavy machine guns, hand 
grenades, and their light artillery.   
Following the German example, the Austrian army had begun 
experimenting with assault units.  They would select elite, young, and fit soldiers 
to form these new assault companies.  They would be given heavier weapons, 
tactical training, and most important, better rations and pay.  They quickly 
became the elite units of the Habsburg Army.  By the end of 1917, every Austrian 
division was projected to have one battalion of Stormtroopers like its German 
ally; but many were already in place for the assault on the Isonzo Valley. 
At 0800 the bombardment ceased and the attack began.  Many assault 
units, including Rommel’s, were able to work their way behind the Italian lines 
taking advantage of the terrain, Italian confusion, and early morning valley fog.  
Now the trench mortars and howitzers concentrated their fire on the Italian 
second position and on the machine gun nests that lay between the first and 
second positions.  Flamethrowers belched and machine guns crackled all along 
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the upper Isonzo.  Italian strong points at the top of mountains and hills were 
either bypassed or leveled by the advancing German and Austrian stormtroopers 
in a race for high ground behind the Italian positions.  In classic stormtrooper 
fashion, the infantry rolled up behind the assault detachments filling in the gaps 
and taking Italian positions as they went.  By nightfall of the first day, the Italians 
were in disarray.  The Austrians and Germans continued their advance at an 
awe-inspiring pace.  Rommel would win his first Pour le M`erite, the coveted 
“Blue Max” (Germany’s highest decoration) in his first day’s fighting.54  
 




By the morning of October 28, four days into the offensive, the Italian 
Army was in retreat away from the Isonzo largely due to the extraordinary efforts 
of the Assault Battalions and their stormtroopers.  Everywhere the Italians 
abandoned equipment in hopes of staying alive and out of German captivity.  
Cadorna proclaimed the retreat “perhaps the greatest catastrophe in history,” 
explicitly blaming his battered soldiers for the retreat.  He went on to say, “The 
failure to resist on the part of the Army, which cravenly withdrew without fighting 
or ignominiously surrendered to the enemy, has allowed the Austro-German 
forces to break through our left flank on the Julian front.”55   
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At no point did Cadorna blame the senior leadership, or himself, for the 
failings of October 24, 1917.  By any standard, the attack by the Central Powers 
along the Isonzo was a success.  Of the two million Italian soldiers arrayed 
against the Austro-German forces at the beginning of the offensive, estimates 
are that between 800,000 and one million had been killed, wounded, or captured.  
More than 3,000 guns, half of the Italian inventory, as well as 1,700 trench 
mortars and 3,000 machine guns were now in the enemy’s hands.56 
 
B. THE WESTERN FRONT 
By November 1, 1917 the Central Powers had reached the Piave River 
nearly ninety miles from their starting point.  The French and British were forced 
to dispatch a total of eleven divisions immediately to the Italian Front to stop the 
German advance before it reached Venice and Padua.  No longer having to 
worry about the collapse of the Habsburg armed forces in Italy, the Germans 
were able to focus exclusively on the Western Front.  The problems for the 
Habsburgs were just beginning by the end of 1917.  The death of the emperor 
and the strains caused by four years of war was beginning to fracture the Austro-
Hungarian alliances along national lines.  In less than a year, those fractures 
would rupture and the once glorious Habsburg Empire would unravel at its 
seams.   
The Italians were not in an enviable position after October 24, 1917.  It 
was as though more than half the army had vanished into thin air.  Men were 
deserting in uncontrollable numbers, many attempted to go home, and others just 
fled in a direction that seemed the safest at the time.  By November 20, Allied 
reinforcements were all that held the crippled Italian army and country together.  
Cadorna was sacked by the government.  Soldiers were escorted back to the 
lines, many at the barrel of Carabinieri rifle.  Others, especially officers, were shot 
if captured while retreating.  It was a tenuous situation by all accounts.  For a 
while, Italy was effectively removed from the war.  For the Austro-German 
Alliance in Italy, the advance would go no further than the Piave.  Fortunately, for                                             
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Italy and the Allies enough of the Italian Army remained and was able to fight 
with renewed vigor, mainly for survival, to stop the Austrians and Germans from 
advancing further. 
As 1917 drew to a close and 1918 began, the German Army had enough 
German soldiers trained in stormtrooper tactics to encourage the General Staff, 
especially Ludendorff, to believe the war could finally be brought to a quick end.  
In the hope of causing another Caporetto on the Western Front, Ludendorff and 
his commanders made one of the biggest miscalculations of the war.   
After Caporetto, the Central Powers were in an excellent position to press 
the Allies for a negotiated peace.  If no further offensives had been undertaken 
by the Central Powers after 1917, it was unlikely that any Allied power had the 
support of the soldiers and the populace to continue the war much longer.  The 
continued arrival of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers to the Western 
Front was the unknown factor.  Germany could have continued on the defensive 
and probably forced a negotiated peace that even Woodrow Wilson, the 
American President, was calling for.  Instead, Ludendorff decided to begin 
planning for a final knock-out punch that would remove Britain from the war and 
leave only an exhausted French army, and an inexperienced American 
Expeditionary Force.  German leaders concluded, primarily because of the 
Isonzo victory, that their tactics were better than that of the Allies.  Thus, planning 
for the Spring Offensive on the Western Front dubbed “Operation Michael” 
commenced. 
Operation Michael officially began on March 21, 1918 in the British sector 
around Cambrai salient.  The British were viewed as the weaker of the two allies 
left facing the German Army.  The German Staff believed that if they could knock 
the British out before significant numbers of raw American troops entered the 
battlefield, the French would be forced to sue for peace.  As was true in Russia 
and on the Isonzo, the “Peace Offensive” began with a massive artillery 
bombardment, including gas.  The assault troops, as rehearsed in the months 
leading up to the massive offensive, used the bombardment as cover to move 
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into attack position.  When the artillery lifted, the stormtroopers attacked.  Many 
British emplacements found themselves cut off and incapable of independent 
action; like the Italian units at Caporetto.  British forces, however, were better 
trained than the Italians and the Russians had been, and were able to place 
more accurate artillery upon the attackers.  While many of the assault troops 
failed to reach their initial objective, they did serve to throw the defenders off 
balance enough to gain moderate ground on the first day. 
By the second day, the slow reflexes of the British command system 
became evident and German advances, although slow, continued.  On the third 
day, the Germans had succeeded in pushing eighty kilometers into the British 
lines.  On the fourth day, however, the advance began to stall.  As happened in 
Caporetto, the German troops were beginning to outrun their supply lines and 
many were seen stopping to loot British supply depots for food and basic 
necessities.   
A key weakness in the tactics, and offensive strategy, of the Assault 
Battalions became apparent.  Advancing troops need supply and artillery to keep 
the attack moving forward; especially when the enemy was falling back on his 
supporting lines. The German logistical system, while superior when working 
within the interior lines of Germany, was not as efficient outside German borders.  
The system was heavily reliant on railroad and horse for supply, and wasn’t 
designed for such operations being carried out deep in Italy or beyond the 
Western Front.  Supplies and artillery were simply unable to keep up– a problem 
that wouldn’t be remedied until the inter-war period after WWI. 
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VIII. THE HARSH REALITIES OF MODERN WARFARE 
All of the armies developed shock troops, but the Germans had 
more of them and used them more effectively than anyone else.  
The amazing success of their March 1918 offensive was mostly 
due to the expert infantrymen employed by Ludendorff as the 
advance fighting force.  Characterized by their ability to take 
advantage of battlefield opportunities, to work with one another in 
constructive teamwork, and to employ their weapons skillfully, such 
elite troops fought hard to win. ... A great tragedy of the war was 
the decision of all participants to employ masses of mediocre 
infantrymen in frontal assaults on enemy trenches.  Therein lies the 
reason for the grim butcher’s bill. 57 
- Hubert C. Johnson, in Breakthrough  
 
Operation Michael succeeded in breaking through the British line, but it 
took three days instead of the single one planned, allowing the British to bring up 
significant reserves.  Ludendorff wasn’t dismayed by the failure of the 
stormtrooper tactics during this offensive and attempted three more offensives 
before the end of summer in hopes of defeating the Allies.  The last of these, 
launched on August 4, 1918, lasted only four days.  When it ended, not only had 
German troops stopped moving forward, they were now starting to retreat.58  Italy 
had managed to regroup after Caporetto, and in early November 1918, 
counterattacked across the Piave.  Much like a year earlier, the Italians were able 
to gain much of the territory lost in a very short amount of time.  On November 
11, the armistice was signed.  The armies of the Central Powers were exhausted. 
Moreover, the civilian populations were spent, fed up with the war, its horrific 
casualties, and the drain on the countries resources. 
The lessons of the latter two years of the war would not be forgotten by 
the defeated German Army.  During the inter-war years that followed, many of 
the leaders responsible for the development and success of the assault 
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battalions would identify the weaknesses within the stormtrooper tactics.  They 
would spend the next twenty years rebuilding and remedying the limitations. 
Tanks and aircraft would become key players in German reorganization.  
Logistics would be dramatically improved in order to support the rapid advance 
into enemy territory.  General Hans von Seekt would assume command in the 
inter-war period as Chief of the General Staff of the remaining German Army, 
now merely a constabulary defense force.  Behind the scenes he would set the 
Germans on a path to rebuild the Army based on the stormtrooper model of 
WWI.  Most importantly, Seeckt realized that the German Army’s earlier failure to 
consider the tank and aircraft as a significant weapon was probably its greatest 
technological mistake. 
Constrained by the Versailles Treaty, General von Seekt broke 
dramatically with German military tradition by advocating the creation of a small, 
elite professional army based on voluntary recruitment rather than conscription.  
For von Seeckt, the key to future victory was mobility:  
The whole future of warfare appears to me to lie in the employment 
of mobile armies, relatively small but of high quality and rendered 
distinctly more effective by the addition of aircraft, and in 
simultaneous mobilization of the whole defense force, be it to feed 
the attack or for home defense.59 
Maintaining the education and training levels of the NCO and junior officers was 
important in the von Seeckt plan for rebuilding, and there were plenty of quality 
officers and NCO’s from the Assault Battalions of WWI who would serve as the 
backbone of an army being rebuilt on the ideas of its new Chief of Staff. 
Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s the German military sought to reinvent 
itself through the lessons of defeat in WWI.  The Army developed an armor 
doctrine hoping to overcome the problems of logistics and distance that 
undermined breakthrough’s of the previous war.  Armor and mobile artillery 
would now be able to drive hundreds of miles into enemy territory.  To go along 
with armor doctrine, the Germans also spent much energy researching and 
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developing an air power doctrine.  Close air support and air liaison officers were 
just two of the developments of the new German system.  As the armor units 
drove deep into enemy territory, fighters and bombers would use liaison officers 
with the ground units to provide the close support from the air.  Stormtroopers 
would also now be delivered by air.  Paratroopers would perform the same 
missions as stormtroopers of the WWI Assault Battalions; but now they could be 
delivered hundreds of miles behind enemy strong points from the air.  They could 
be re-supplied by air and were critical in softening up the enemy rear for the 
rapidly advancing armor and infantry units.  The whole system was developed to 
create rapid mobility, confuse the enemy, and bring the offensive back to modern 
warfare.   
Germany would first be able to test these knew principles on the European 
continent in the mid-1930’s with the Spanish Civil War.  Germany and Italy 
supported the Fascist rebels trying to overthrow the Nationalist armies supported 
by British, French, and American volunteers.  The tools developed by the 
German Army in the inter-war period would get their baptism of fire during this 
conflict.  Nonetheless, German forces, methods, and equipment didn’t impress 
outside observers or actually influence the outcome of the Spanish Civil War.  In 
fact, they performed rather poorly by German standards.  What the Spanish Civil 
War did was give the Germans a live fire exercise in the principles they were 
developing over the last fifteen years.  Given this data, the German military would 
refine the processes and fix the problems quickly. 
By the spring of 1940, just two years after the Spanish Civil War ended, 
the fate of Belgium and the defense of Northern France once again rested on a 
series of fortresses along the German-Belgium border.  These concrete 
fortresses, known collectively as the Maginot Line, were modern in design and 
equipped with artillery of all calibers, antitank guns, and machine guns.  They 
dominated the surrounding landscape.  Infantry attacks on these fortresses, of 
the kind attempted during WWI, would have been suicide.  Air bombardment 
would have done, as they were mostly underground and hardened to an 
unprecedented degree. 
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The strongest and most strategic point for German planners was the 
fortress at Eben Emael.  On May 1, 1940 the Germans attacked the fortress.  
Using shell holes made by their artillery the night before, German engineers crept 
forward to the base of the fort.  When the sun rose on May 1, flamethrowers and 
shape charges went into the cupolas defending the fort.  Simultaneously, a glider 
force landed and joined in the fight.  This attack had been rehearsed numerous 
times in Germany against a scale model of Eben Emael.  The rehearsals allowed 
the forces involved in the intricate plan to perfect the complex timing of the 
operation.   
The attacking element was not a division, or even a regiment.  The attack 
did not include one heavy bomber or fighter aircraft.  There was not one single 
tank in the operation.  The fortress was taken in classic stormtroop and assault 
battalion form; with one battalion of combat engineers acting in concert with a 
glider-borne engineering platoon.  By the end of the morning the fort was 
defenseless and surrendered.  German forces poured through the hole in 
Belgium, and through the lightly defended Ardennes into France and Holland.  
The vision of Schlieffen more than thirty years earlier had been fulfilled. 
Despite volumes of available material about the First World War, 
historians writing in languages other than German largely ignored the great 
campaigns from Italy and the East – especially the Allies.  Historian Bruce 
Gudmundsson further explains in his book Stormtroop Tactics: 
The lack of source material was not what prevented adequate 
coverage of stormtroop tactics.  The handicap that prevented 
adequate coverage of stormtroop tactics was twofold ... First, 
military writers were mostly products of the French approach to 
tactics.  Seeing tactics as an exercise in engineering, these writers 
were looking for the formula for German tactics in WWI – how many 
guns per yard of front and how many waves of infantry per 
battalion.60 
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France, Britain, and America all underestimated the German program to 
rebuild and replenish after WWI.  Most in the Allied camp assumed that if war 
broke out in Europe again, it would look very similar to the warfare of WWI.  They 
couldn’t have been more wrong.  Gudmundsson again points out: 
Thus, they missed the intangibles – the social relations between 
officers, NCO’s and men – that were the essence of stormtroop 
tactics.  Second, like all members of their generation, military 
writers were affected by wartime propaganda, which depicted the 
Germans as heartless automatons who were as incapable of 
independent action on the battlefield as they were of human feeling.  
That such “Huns” were capable of the most fluid infantry tactics of 
the war would be a difficult proposition for such writers to 
swallow.61 
Misunderstanding one’s enemy has been a problem plaguing military 
planners and professionals, not only leading up to WWI, but through the Inter-
War period and into WWII, Korea, and Vietnam.  Surely similarities can even be 
drawn with operations occurring today in Afghanistan and Iraq.     
The rest of the world was forced to recognize in the early months of WWII, 
that German units were capable of independent action on the battlefield.  
Fortunately, the Allied armies caught on quickly and began to modernize and 
adapt to the German model.  In the process, they adopted many of the German 
innovations.  The German Blitzkrieg, or “lightning war,” and forms thereof, would 
soon become standard practice in the ground, air, and sea doctrines of all 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The crucial decisions for the Germans that resulted in their 
battlefield triumphs early in World War II came in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I. 62 
- Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett,                                      
in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period 
 
Many of the tactics used in the blitzkrieg tactics of WWII were born in the 
final years of WWI and the Interwar Years that followed.  The specific tactical 
operations involved in the German Blitzkrieg were developed in the 1920’s.  
Unlike other Western armies, such as the British who did experiment with 
advanced tactics but never incorporated them, the Germans learned to ignore 
the continuous line of attack strategy.  Examples of the new German Blitzkrieg 
tactics were readily visible in the support provided the Fascists during the 
Spanish Civil War.   
When war erupted in 1939 and 1940, most Western armies fell back on 
the outdated doctrine and tactics of WWI – defense. In contrast to other armies, 
the German Army carried out a systematic study of the lessons of WWI and 
instituted the lessons, successfully charted the course of future warfare.  The rest 
of the world was forced to play catch up. 
The German Army stunned the world with the rapid and devastating 
invasions, and defeats, of European powers Poland and France.  Utilizing new 
tactical innovations developed and tested during the inter-war period between 
WWI and the onset of WWII, Germany managed to revolutionize the combat 
warfare that would follow.  Combining quick-strike armored and infantry divisions, 
close air support, and logistical support, the German military was able to drive 
deep into Polish and French territory.  Isolated and surrounded, the Polish and 
French militaries were helpless to stop the German advance.  What had become  
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known as Blitzkrieg, or “lighting war,” would now become the tactical model for 
any conventional military hoping to succeed on the field of battle for the next half-
century.   
In 1950 on the Korean peninsula, United Nation (U.N.) forces desperately 
needed to break out from the stalemate that had developed around the South 
Korean city of Pusan.  In a brilliant move, U.N. forces (mainly United States.) 
conducted a series of landings along the west coast of South Korea far north of 
North Korean forces; the most notable being the landings at Inch’on.  Security, 
simplicity, speed, and combined naval and air support allowed numerous 
armored and infantry divisions to come ashore. Once ashore, the combined 
forces pushed deep into the Korean mainland behind the majority of North 
Korean forces, still surrounding Pusan.  North Korean forces were now isolated 
and cut-off from command and supply lines.  The U.N. forces around Pusan were 
then able to break out and force a hasty North Korean retreat. 
In late October 1956, Israeli forces invaded the Gaza Strip and Sinai 
Peninsula.  Using surprise and operational security, Israeli armored and infantry 
forces advanced quickly towards the Suez Canal zone.  Egyptian forces fought 
bravely but couldn’t withstand the initial coordinated onslaught of air, naval, and 
land forces Israel, and her allies (Britain and France), threw against them.  While 
a political disaster for all involved, militarily it was a tremendous success for 
Israel.  The elements of the German Blitzkrieg tactics, surprise, security, violence 
of execution, and combined arms tactics ensured quick military success.   
Looking ahead almost forty years to the end of the Cold War, during 
Operations DESERT STORM, in January 1991, and IRAQI FREEDOM, in April 
2003, the United States military achieved overwhelming, and tremendously 
lopsided, victories against Sadaam Hussein and his forces.  Both U.S. offensives 
combined the superior technological and tactical innovations of the late 20th 
Century in order to quickly, and violently, defeat the Iraqi enemy.  Individual air, 
land, and naval forces fought as what appeared to the enemy as a single 
coordinated force.  In both offensives speed, surprise, operational security, and 
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violence of execution thus allowed air, land, and naval forces to rapidly break 
through the initial resistance.  Once behind enemy lines, ground forces rapidly 
moved deep into the enemy rear.  Isolated and cut off from their command and 
control, the remaining pockets of Iraqi resistance became easy targets for follow-
on air strikes and supporting U.S. ground forces.  The U.S. had achieved tactical 
victory, not in weeks and months, but in days.  Yet in the end they had only 
practiced the orthodox.  Operation IRAQI FREEDOM had only begun.  The 
enemy began waging an insurgency and the U.S. military, led from above, could 
not adapt rapidly. 
In the future, the lessons of WWI, Caporetto, and the German model for 
innovation and infiltration tactics can, and should, be utilized against the enemies 
of the United States.  The weaknesses of the U.S. military are also its greatest 
strength; its reliance on technology, mass, and bureaucracy.  The enemies of 
tomorrow are developing “infiltration tactics” today.  From the lowest levels of 
command, small units pass through friendly lines and attack the soft rear, with 
improvised explosive devices and other anti-personnel weapons.  To accomplish 
this infiltration the enemy will not only use traditional maneuver tactics, but the 
vast information realm known as cyberspace.   
Moreover, the adversaries know that if they can’t be seen, they can’t be 
easily struck.  Blending in to the civilian population and information realm gives 
the enemy a stealth capability as well as a propaganda advantage when 
innocents are caught in any crossfire.  Innovation in the enemy system does not 
come from the top down as much as it comes from the bottom up.  The senior 
leadership becomes the primary targets in any attack from a conventional military 
today.  Therefore, enemies must decentralize much of their operations to the 
lowest possible levels in order to have any prolonged success.  What is seen, 
and will be seen, is a continued decentralization of enemy operations in order to 
develop and train a new “younger” generation of fighters; the current version of 
the junior officer and NCO.   
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German advances in WWI didn’t bring strategic victory, but lead to the 
development of a tactical doctrine twenty years later that did bring strategic 
victory.  Only when the rest of the world began listening to troops on the ground, 
and began instituting their lessons, was the German advantage checked.  It is 





























The names of many of the towns, cities, mountains, and rivers used in this 
thesis have changed many times since 1918.  This study attempts to use the 
names of the places as they would have been in 1918.  That has produced and 
unique mix of German, Italian, and Slovenian usage.  The languages of the 
region, being as diverse as the place names, have several unique pronunciations 
that may be unfamiliar to the Standard English speaking reader.  Included here 
are some of the unique grammar quirks that come with specific languages, 
especially Slovenian.  
 
A. PRONUNCIATION 
 1.  “i” – In Slavic, “i” is pronounced with the long “e” of English.  For 
example, Kobarid, is pronounced “ko-bar-ee-d.”  
 2.  “e” – In Slavic, “e” is pronounced with the long “a” of English.  For 
example, the Slovenian word for “red” – rdeč – is pronounced, “rr-day-ch.” 
 3.  “j” – In Slavic, “j” is pronounced like the “y” in English, but not as the 
vowel usage.  For example, the capitol of Slovenia, “Ljubljana,” is pronounced, 
“L-yub-l-y-ana.” 
 4.  “o” – In Slavic, “o” is pronounced with the long “o” of English, i.e., “oh”.  
For example, “Kobarid” or “Soča” would be pronounced “K-oh-bar-ee-d,” or “Sow-
cha.” 
 5.  Č – In Slavic languages, this is pronounced like the “ch” in English.  Ex: 
Soča, pronounced: So-ch-a. 
 6.  Ž – Pronounced as “zh.”  The second “g” in garage is a good example.  
 7.  Š – Pronounced as “sh” in English.  Vršič, pronounced: Ver-sh-ee-ch. 
 8.  “c” – Pronounced like “c” in English city.  
 9.  ü – Pronounced in German as the long “u” in English, i.e., “you.”  
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B. PLACE NAMES 
*  Represents the name most often referred to today. 
GERMAN  ITALIAN  SLOVENIAN   (PROUNCIATION) 
1.  Flitsch  Plezzo  * Bovec  (bow-vets) 
2.  Karfreit  Caporetto  *Kobarid (ko-bar-ead) 
3.  Tolmein  Tolmino  * Tolmin (toll-mean) 
4. * Mt. Krn  Mt. Nero  * Mt. Krn (kirn) 
5.  Isonzo  Isonzo  * Soča (sow-cha) 
6.  Laibach  * Ljubljana  * Ljubljana (lu-bee-ya-na) 
7.  Triest  * Trieste  * Trst   (tirst) 
8.  * Wien  * Vienna  Dunaj  (dew-ni) 
9.  St. Lucia  St. Lucia  * Most na Soč (most-na-soch) 
10.  Görz  * Gorizia  * Nova Gorizia  
11.  Luico  Luico   * Livek (lee-veck) 
12.  Bainsizza Bainsizza  * Banjšice (Ban-yish-say) 
13.  N/A  Capodistria  * Koper (cope-er) 
14. N/A  Doberdo  * Doberdob (dober-dobe) 
15.  Pola  Pola   * Pula  (pool-a) 
16.  Canale  Canale  * Kanal (canal) 
17.  Fiume  Fiume   * Rijeka (ree-yay-ka) 









2. Isonzo Front 1915 – 1918: 
 
 
WHITE AREA: Italian territory 1915 
TAN AREA:  Austro-Hungarian Territory 1915 
SOLID RED LINE:  Furthest Advance of Italian Army in 1917 
BROKEN RED LINE:  Furthest Advance of German-Austrian Army 1917-1918 
 
*  Most of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the map was awarded to Italy in the 




Courtesy of the Kobarid WWI Museum 
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• The dotted blue lines show the initial positions of the Austro-
Hungarian divisions in 1915. 
• The solid blue lines represent the Austro-Hungarian positions 
before October 24, 1917 
 
 
Courtesy of the Kobarid WWI Museum 
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81 
APPENDIX C 
A. THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 
 
For those interested in touring the battlefields of the Twelve Isonzo 
Offensives, the area is easily accessible.  Major U.S. and European airlines 
operate regular flights into Venice, Trieste, and Ljubljana.  The country of 
Slovenia is part of the European Union and a member of NATO.  With a passport 
and a very good pair of hiking boots, touring the battlefields of the Italian Front 
can be very rewarding.  Many of the locations still look today as they did ninety 
years ago, when war first came to the region.  The people of the region are 
hospitable and friendly, and most speak a combination of languages; including 
English, Italian, German, and French.  
The Soca Valley, and most of Slovenia, is an outdoor enthusiast’s 
paradise.  With miles of hiking trails, paragliding, kayaking, bicycling routs, and 
fishing of all kinds, there is plenty to do to keep anyone dutifully occupied.   
For historians, the locations of the major battles are not difficult to find.  
One only needs a good map and a keen eye.  Most of the locations are not off 
limits, and some appear as if the war had ended a few days ago.  From the 
Julian Alps in the north to the Carso in the South, most are accessible by either 
auto or foot.  Mounts Rombon, Krn, Javorca, and Mrzli Vrh are difficult hikes, but 
the reward is worth the effort.  Many trenches, caverns, and artifacts still remain 
along the paths and at the peaks.  Many of the paths used to reach the peaks 
today are those that were cut almost a century ago by the soldiers attacking and 
defending these locations.     
A good place to start is in the town of Bovec.  It sits under the shadow of 
Mt. Rombon where some of the bloodiest and fiercest fighting of the entire war 
took place.  It is where Mussolini first experienced the horrors of the Great War.  
There is a small private museum in the town, and a number of historical 
monuments to see in the area.  Hiking Mt. Rombon is arduous and can be 
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dangerous since its peaks are generally snow covered all year round.  It is 
recommended that only experienced climbers and hikers make a run at its peaks.  
Moreover, there are still unexploded ordinance and deep caverns at its summit.  
If interested, there are hiking groups that semi-regularly hike the mountain.  
Moving south from Bovec, the next stop is the quaint and quiet town of Kobarid. 
Kobarid contains probably the best and only true World War I museum in 
the region.  It received the European Community’s award for European Museum 
in 1993.  The staff is very helpful and the museum is really first rate.  It should be 
the first stop in any tour of the Soca Valley.  The museum has numerous maps, 
books, and videos describing the terrible fighting that went on in the high Julian 
Alps; including hiking maps for those so inclined.  Also in Kobarid is an Italian 
ossuary.  The memorial was opened by Mussolini in 1938 and bears the remains 
of more than 7,000 Italian soldiers who fell between Mt. Rombon and the town of 
Tolmin further south.  From the ossuary a wonderful view of the town and 
surrounding valley can be seen. 
Continuing down the valley is the town of Tolmin, the county seat for the 
region.  The town never fell to the Italian armies and is surrounded by a plethora 
of wonderful monuments.  Located directly along the emerald green waters of the 
Soca River, Tolmin is an excellent place to stop and spend a day.  Along the 
rivers edge is a walled German ossuary where the remains of the German 
soldiers from the final offensive are buried.  Near Tolmin, under the heights of the 
Mrzli ridge at Javorca lies the beautiful Church of the Holy Ghost, another difficult 
hike but the payoff is well worth the effort.  The church was built by Austrian 
soldiers in 1916 in honor of the 3rd Mountain Brigade and the soldiers who died 
defending the Mrzli ridge.  The interior is lined with wood panels and the names 
of the dead, painted in black.  It is finished in bright blue tones and wonderfully 
pristine marble.  The church is not only moving, but one of the best preserved 
monuments along the Isonzo.  Below and behind the church in the cow pastures 




monuments, and ruins line a small country road leading away from the chapel 
and Tolmin.  It is an interesting glimpse into the life of soldiers behind the front 
lines and the defenses they built. 
Continuing down the road from Tolmin, the Bainsizza Plateau rises in the 
foreground.  Along the road, and in many of the small towns, are caverns, 
cemeteries, and monuments to the soldiers and units who fought here.  On the 
other side of the Bainsizza is the city of Gorizia.  What was Gorizia in WWI is 
now two cities: Gorizia, on the Italian side of the border, and Nova Gorizia, or 
“new” Gorizia on the Slovenian side.  The town was virtually split by the Iron 
Curtain after WWII and thus the two names.  On the Slovenian side is Mt. 
Sabotino, Mt. San Gabriele, and Mt. Santo.  The holy pilgrimage site of Sveta 
Gora, destroyed by Italian artillery in the early years of the fighting, stands at the 
peak of Mt. Santo.  The site is maintained by the Slovenian government and also 
has a museum dedicated to the fighting that went on around Sveta Gora.   
Gorizia is a cosmopolitan Italian city, but it does have a museum located 
in the center of the city with numerous rooms and displays highlighting the 
fighting that defended the city.  Located on a hill in the center and next to the 
castle that dominates the landscape, the museum provides a spectacular view of 
the surrounding countryside and Julian Alps. 
South of Gorizia, where the Isonzo makes its final jaunt before emptying 
into the Adriatic, is the Carso.  Near the town of Redipuglia is another immense 
Italian ossuary with the remains of more than 100,000 Italians.  The ossuary 
overlooks the Carso and delivers a sobering view of the rocky hills that cost so 
many Italian and Austrian soldiers their lives.  Within the grounds of the ossuary 
is a museum dedicated to the 3rd Army, an impressive outdoor museum with all 
of the artillery used by the Italians in WWI, and a reconstructed stone trench; a 
remnant of the 1915 fighting for Mt. Sei Busi. 
The Soča Valley today is wonderfully preserved and picturesque.  Visiting 
the Isonzo Front is an experience that will last a lifetime, and an honor to those 
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